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DIVERSITY GONE WRONG: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO THE 
EVOLVING MEANING OF DIVERSITY FROM BAKKE TO FISHER 
Ofra Bloch* 
Diversity has played an unparalleled role in America’s affirmative action law and politics, most recently in Fisher 
v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II).  However, our understanding of diversity is insufficient, 
particularly in the arena of higher education.  This Article aims to enhance this understanding by offering a 
sociohistorical account of how the diversity rationale has evolved over time, which supplements the existing literature 
that has focused on judicial decisions.  By analyzing the numerous amicus briefs filed before the Supreme Court 
in cases challenging affirmative action over the years, this Article demonstrates that questions about the value of 
diversity in higher education were not settled in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke or 
subsequent cases, but rather were renegotiated by citizens and officials.  The Article then shows how judicial and 
professional understandings of diversity have shifted from egalitarian notions of racial equality towards market-
driven utilitarian ideals.  In turn, this utilitarian framework has come to shape the way universities and student 
activists think, talk, and act regarding questions of racial justice. It has steered the public vocabulary and 
imagination away from identifying past and present racial inequality, as well as its relevance to the mission of 
higher education. 
The Article concludes by suggesting that it is imperative to reinfuse diversity with egalitarian ideals.  Universities 
and others who invoke diversity claims in courts or on campus should not only acknowledge the utilitarian benefits 
of diversity that make affirmative action less controversial, but also keep sight of the egalitarian perspective that is 
at the core of racial justice.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Racial diversity eliminates racial identifiability; racial identifiability is important 
evidence of segregation and discrimination . . . .  Considering race and ethnicity in 
admissions alleviates past and present inequalities and discrimination . . . .  
Diversity, desegregation, and past discrimination are doctrinally distinct, but 
factually, they are deeply interconnected. 
—Amicus Brief, Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)1 
Put simply, students need to learn how to work with, market to, and buy from 
people from diverse backgrounds and cultures. 
—Amicus Brief, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (2013)2 
 
Diversity has played a growing role in shaping America’s affirmative 
action law and politics—most recently in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin 
(Fisher II)3—determining questions of access to higher education.  Over the 
years, the United States Supreme Court has embraced the value of diversity 
as the primary rationale for sanctioning the consideration of race in higher 
education admissions policies.4  Nowadays, the question of how universities 
define their interest in diversity not only plays a role in licensing or restricting 
such policies in court, but also shapes the public conversation about racial 
justice on campus.5  Our understanding of this concept however, remains 
insufficient.  What makes diversity a constitutionally compelling interest?  
What values does it express?  And most importantly, when do diversity claims 
promote equality and when do they inhibit it? 
In an attempt to begin answering these questions, this Article offers a 
sociohistorical account of diversity in the realm of higher education.  It shows 
how, despite doctrinal constraints imposed by the Court, questions about the 
role of affirmative action in higher education were not settled in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke 6  or thereafter, but forged in an ongoing 
conversation over the value of diversity.  The meaning of diversity, the 
	
 1 Brief of Am. Law Deans Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter ALDA Brief, Grutter]. 
 2 Brief of Amherst et al., Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 29, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at 
Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) [hereinafter Amherst Brief, Fisher I]. 
 3 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210, 2215 (2016) (upholding the University of Texas at Austin’s affirmative action 
program and noting that diversity constitutes a compelling interest). 
 4 Except for the narrow and mostly dormant interest in remedying specific instances of institutional 
racial discrimination.  See infra Part II and especially notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
 5 SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 16 (2003) (explaining how diversity has 
become a “mantra” in educational circles (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also infra Part VI.B. 
 6 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (stating that “the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a 
university’s admissions program”). 
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Article reveals, has been and still is subject to continuous contestation and 
development.  Analyzing the numerous amicus curiae briefs filed before the 
Supreme Court in the cases challenging higher-education affirmative action, 
the Article explores the evolving meaning of the diversity rationale.  It 
uncovers how remedial interests, which were rejected in Bakke, as well as 
other egalitarian and democratic values, found their way back into the 
conversation over affirmative action through the different interpretations of 
diversity in the briefs and by the Court. 
This Article then reveals that convictions about the value of diversity are 
dynamic and have shifted over time.  It shows how, through ongoing conflict 
over affirmative action, the constitutional understanding of diversity has 
drifted away from notions of equal citizenship and racial equity towards 
market-driven interests that focus on preparing students for a diverse and 
global workforce.  These interests celebrate differences, but are divorced 
from the history of state-enforced hierarchies that affirmative action was 
originally set to dismantle.  Thus, the meaning assigned to diversity has most 
notably existed along a spectrum.  One end of the spectrum vindicates 
egalitarian values that include both retrospective, remedial ideals, and 
prospective interests in equal citizenship; the other end is what I call the 
utilitarian conception of diversity, invoking pedagogical and other functional 
benefits, and most dominantly relying on the business case for diversity, 7 
aiming to benefit the professional training of students and foster the 
economy.  The transformation from an egalitarian understanding of diversity 
to a utilitarian one might have garnered much-needed support for the 
practice of affirmative action, but at a cost: that of neglecting the history of 
discrimination and obscuring the persistence of racial inequality when 
defining the mission of higher education.  These costs, I suggest, are evident 
in the recent wave of student activism. 
 Debates about affirmative action are debates about equal opportunity 
and how it should be structured as a matter of legal doctrine and educational 
policy.  In other words, because affirmative action is one of the few 
institutional reactions to racial inequality, important questions of law and 
equality are at stake in how the courts and universities describe their 
commitment to affirmative measures.  Critical scholarship that started 
appearing after Bakke warned that a diversity rationale (as opposed to 
remedial and distributive rationales) is far from being a viable means of 
ensuring affirmative action, and that it is actually “a serious distraction in the 
ongoing efforts to achieve racial justice.”8  This Article aligns somewhat with 
	
7 See infra note 43. 
8 Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003).  For a more detailed 
survey of the critical scholarship on diversity sparked by Bakke, see infra notes 73–76, as well as notes 
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this critical tradition, but departs from it in significant ways.  It draws 
predominantly on  democratic constitutionalism scholarship and employs the 
understanding that formal law-making and adjudication are platforms for 
democratic deliberation, through which changes in legal and constitutional 
understandings of citizens and officials take place.9  Investigating the amicus 
briefs, this Article explores how changes in professional and judicial 
understandings of diversity were forged through the interaction between 
university officials and social movements inside and outside of courtrooms. 
While the Court has settled some questions of law, on which the 
scholarship on diversity has centered,10  this Article recognizes that non-
judicial actors also had a significant impact on shaping the value of diversity.  
Thus, instead of treating diversity as a term with fixed meaning determined 
by the Court, I turn to the amicus briefs—focusing especially on those filed 
by university officials, higher education organizations, and students—to 
uncover how convictions about the value of diversity in higher education 
have shifted over the years.  This untold history of diversity’s constitutional 
meaning allows for a more nuanced critique—not of a theoretical conception 
of diversity, but of what it has come to mean over time and the role it has 
	
262–66 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
 10 Doctrinal analyses have dominated the legal scholarship on diversity in the realm of higher 
education.  To name but a few examples, see Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The 
Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381–82, 84 (1998) 
(discussing the “compelling interest” test and its implications to the diversity rationale).  See generally 
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (1996) (discussing 
the importance of diversity in light of the jurisprudence that followed Bakke).  For more recent 
examples, see generally Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Diversity Paradox: Judicial Review in an Age of 
Demographic and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 113 (2012) (discussing Fourteenth 
Amendment doctrine in the then forthcoming Fisher I decision).  Despite the article’s title, it does 
not include a discussion concerning the meaning of diversity, but discusses doctrinal alternatives 
that would allow universities to continue pursuing their educational benefits.  Kimberly Jenkins 
Robinson, Comment, Fisher’s Cautionary Tale and the Urgent Need for Equal Access to an Excellent 
Education, 130 HARV. L. REV. 185 (2016) (considering how universities can advance diversity post-
Fisher II).  Other scholars broaden their doctrinal investigation and focus on normative questions—
namely, when a state should seek to promote diversity.  For comprehensive normative accounts, 
see generally PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE 
DISTANCE (2003) and LEVINSON, supra note 5. 
For a survey of the critical scholarship and its focus on jurisprudence, see infra notes 73–76, 
262–67 and accompanying text.  The critiques of diversity are, of course, not limited to the legal 
literature.  For an incredibly extensive account of diversity discourse, see generally ELLEN BERREY, 
THE ENIGMA OF DIVERSITY: THE LANGUAGE OF RACE AND THE LIMITS OF RACIAL JUSTICE 
(2015) (investigating the symbolic politics of diversity and showing how the shift to diversity 
legitimates and delegitimizes racial hierarchies).  Despite Berrey’s deep understanding of the 
ambiguity of diversity, she treats legal doctrine as an external and fixed factor that influences the 
organizational culture of diversity.  Thus, even when acknowledging the ambiguous nature of 
diversity, both the doctrinal and critical literatures on diversity have failed to account for its evolving 
constitutional meaning.  This Article seeks to fill this gap and to provide an account of the 
interaction between judicial and non-judicial actors that has shaped the value of diversity over time. 
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played in both promoting and inhibiting equality.  And thus, instead of 
overthrowing the diversity framework as a whole or seeking to supplement it 
with external rationales, like many critical legal scholars have proposed,11 I 
suggest what can and should be done under existing law of affirmative action. 
In Bakke and subsequent cases, the Court imposed constraints on the 
rationales that can justify affirmative action in the realm of higher education, 
rejecting explicit remedial rationales while allowing the use of race-conscious 
measures to promote educational benefits that result from student-body 
diversity.12 Scholars have mainly focused on these restrictions,13 but for the 
argument this Article lays out, they serve only as a point of departure. The 
Article first uncovers that although the Court’s jurisprudence restricted these 
rationales, the value of diversity was re-negotiated and unsettled by other 
actors, and the debate over rationales for affirmative action was re-opened 
through a backdoor.  Analyzing the amicus briefs filed to the Court in Gratz 
v. Bollinger 14  and Grutter v. Bollinger 15  (together “the Michigan cases”) by 
universities and other amici, I show that both prospective and retrospective 
egalitarian interests were not eliminated from the debate over affirmative 
action, but were reinfused into a more covert conversation over the value of 
diversity.  Both the litigants and most of the amici formally complied with 
the Court’s restrictions and did not openly invoke an interest in rectifying the 
wrongs of the past, yet their interpretations of diversity were informed by 
remedial and other egalitarian and democratic values. 
Second, the Article analyzes the conversation that evolved in this space of 
meaning-making over the years.  By comparing the content of the amicus 
briefs filed in Grutter and Gratz (2003) with those filed in Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin (Fisher I) (2013) 16  and Fisher II (2016), 17  I show how 
constitutional understandings of diversity shifted from remedial and 
distributive notions about the role of higher education towards utilitarian, 
mostly market-driven, concerns.  Despite the expansive interpretation 
adopted by the Court in Grutter, which included both instrumental and 
	
 11 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 8, at 1622 (listing four reasons why diversity is actually a way for universities 
to continue admitting children of wealth and privilege); see also Richard Delgado, Why Universities 
Are Morally Obligated to Strive for Diversity: Restoring the Remedial Rationale for Affirmative Action, 68 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1997) (arguing that diversity must be supplemented with a remedial 
rationale for affirmative action); Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture?  Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1803, 1810 (2000) (explaining why diversity is dangerous when understood as the only rationale for 
affirmative action). 
 12 See infra Part II and particularly infra notes 54–58.  Bakke was a plurality opinion, but it was later 
affirmed in Grutter and more recently in Fisher I  and Fisher II. 
 13 See infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. 
 14 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 15 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 16 570 U.S. 297 (2013). 
 17 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
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egalitarian, as well as democratic interests in fighting social exclusion,18 for 
the amici in the Fisher litigation, diversity was mostly a utilitarian, market-
oriented interest, divorced from any remedial aspirations or from more 
prospective ideals of distribution and equal citizenship.  Their business case 
for diversity was decoupled from egalitarian values and committed to the 
economic well-being and success of students preparing to enter the 
heterogeneous workforce. 
Third, the Article employs this historical account to explore the question 
of when diversity claims promote equality and when they restrict it, and to 
develop a better understanding of the tradeoffs in arguing about diversity in 
one way or another.  The Article explores the reasons for and benefits of 
adopting a utilitarian approach to diversity and proceeds to critically 
examine this development.  I argue that, over time, diversity was resignified to 
legitimate the persistence of racial hierarchies. 19   The dynamic of 
resignification is a way in which prior standards of critique and reform are 
adopted in a diluted and modified way that can help the system gain 
legitimacy without disrupting its overall practices and structure. 20   This 
concept is central to comprehending what is at stake in abandoning the 
egalitarian interpretation of diversity in the struggle for racial justice. 
Diversity is possibly the most dominant form of public discourse about 
race on campus today.  The way we talk and think about diversity in courts 
and on campus affects the way that we and our institutions approach 
questions of racial justice.  Amicus briefs are, to a large degree, strategic, and 
surely they do not represent the only conversation about race that is taking 
place in universities.  However, amicus briefs both reflect and shape 
convictions about the value of diversity.21  The utilitarian framework that is 
revealed in the Fisher I briefs conceptualizes diversity in ahistorical and 
instrumental terms, providing a way to talk about race in symbolic and 
indirect terms of identity and culture, without bringing up racism or 
inequality.  And thus, I argue, it works to obscure their existence and 
legitimizes their persistence by making them invisible and irrelevant to the 
project of affirmative action, as well as to the mission of higher education.  In 
other words, the popular utilitarian framework steers the public language 
and imagination away from identifying past and present racial injustices, as 
well as their relevance to the mission of higher education. 
	
 18 See infra Part III.B. 
 19 See Nancy Fraser, Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History, in FORTUNES OF FEMINISM: FROM 
STATE-MANAGED CAPITALISM TO NEOLIBERAL CRISIS 219 (2013) (discussing the process of 
resignification in the context of second-wave feminism which shifted attention away from 
redistribution and toward recognition).  For a broad discussion on resignification, see infra Part VI.B. 
 20 Fraser, supra note 19, at 218. 
 21 See infra Part VI.B and particularly infra notes 278–79 and accompanying text. 
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While these costs might sound theoretical or abstract, the Article suggests 
that we might already be witnessing some of the implications of the all-
utilitarian approach to questions of race in the recent wave of student 
activism.  Thus, the Article turns to explore the relationship between the 
takeover of the utilitarian conception of diversity and student demands on 
campus.  In recent years, students all over the United States have been 
mobilizing around demands for renaming buildings on campus, adopting 
trigger warnings, and establishing safe spaces.22  Of course, each of these 
demands should be debated on its own merits and in context, and the Article 
does not take a stand in this nuanced discussion, but proposes that the costs 
of adopting a market-driven and identity-centered approach to questions of 
racial justice are evident in these demands.  This movement can be 
understood as a form of backlash to the utilitarian paradigm that has been 
controlling the conversation on race in the past decade, and aspiring to get 
their institutions to acknowledge the wrongs of the past and to commit, once 
again, to rectifying them.  However, the demands resulting from this 
backlash appear to be confined to similar symbolic conceptions of race as 
identity and culture rather than as a category of power, and thus risk 
sustaining racial stratification in the effort to resist it. 
This Article shows that diversity is fundamentally and historically 
ambiguous, and can accommodate conservative as well as progressive ideals 
about race and inequality.  In the past decade, diversity has come to embody 
mostly market-driven commitments.  This shift risks undermining the long-
term struggle for racial equality by diverting our institutional attention away 
from the ways in which race still shapes educational opportunities to the impact 
of diversity on economic success, making us morally numb to the hierarchical 
status quo.  It is imperative, I suggest, to reinfuse the concept of diversity with 
egalitarian ideals, honestly acknowledging the persistence of racial inequality 
and holding universities accountable for their part in sustaining it.  Thus, 
instead of rejecting this body of law, I suggest that universities and others who 
invoke diversity claims in courts or in schools should do so with attention to 
both the advantages of utilitarian diversity that make it popular even among 
many conservatives, and its cost of undermining the struggle for racial equality, 
and try to strike a balance between the two approaches.  One, relatively 
feasible way of doing so is to return to past interpretations of diversity that 
embraced both utilitarian and egalitarian values. 
In the past decade of affirmative action case law—from Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, through Fisher I, to Schuette v. 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action—the Court has imposed growing constraints 
	
 22 See infra Part VI.C. 
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on affirmative action policies and on diversity efforts.23  In contrast, in the 
recent Fisher II decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, determined 
that, in defining student body diversity, considerable deference is owed to the 
universities. 24   This deference, I argue, has reopened the space for 
constitutional meaning-making.  This space, I suggest, should be used by 
universities and advocates as an opportunity to re-infuse diversity with 
egalitarian values, which have been lost over time, but remain very relevant 
today.  More concretely, as race-conscious affirmative action policies are 
continually challenged, 25  and with diversity being the only permissible 
rationale to license such policies in the near future, universities should frame 
their interest in diversity so that it reflects their commitment not only to the 
success of their students in the workforce, but also to equal citizenship. 
The Article proceeds in seven parts: Part I introduces the taxonomy of 
egalitarian, utilitarian, and democratic conceptions of diversity, which is used 
in the following parts to identify the historical transformations in the meaning 
of diversity.  Part II describes the constraints on affirmative action practice 
and discourse that the Court posed in Bakke.  Part III explores how, despite 
these constraints, questions about the role of affirmative action in higher 
education were not settled by the Court, but were constantly forged in an 
ongoing conversation over the value of diversity.  Part IV shows how judicial 
and professional understandings of diversity have, over time, drifted away 
from retrospective and prospective egalitarian logics towards pedagogical 
and market-oriented, utilitarian interests.  Part V analyzes the most recent 
affirmative action case, Fisher II, and conceives of this decision as a re-opened 
space for constitutional meaning-making as well as an opportunity to infuse 
diversity with old and new commitments.  Part VI draws on this account of 
diversity’s transformation to consider the stakes in arguing about diversity in 
one way or another.  It explores how the dominant utilitarian approach to 
diversity takes part in shaping the public discussion about racial justice and 
probes possible implications it might have had on recent student activism.  
Part VII concludes by asking how diversity might be enhanced, and teases 
	
 23 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1630, 1635 (2014); Fisher I, 133 S. 
Ct. 2411, 2415, 2419–21 (2013); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 729–32 (2007).  For a brief discussion of the constraints imposed by these cases, see infra 
Part V.B and particularly infra notes 236–39. 
 24 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016) (finding that “[t]he University has thus met its burden of showing that 
the admissions policy it used at the time it rejected petitioner’s application was narrowly tailored”). 
 25 Two lawsuits challenging race-conscious admissions policies are currently pending: Complaint & 
Demand for Jury Trial at 43, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard 
Coll., No. 1:14-cv-14176-DJC (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 2014) (alleging that Harvard discriminates 
against Asian-Americans in admissions); Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 2, 21–22, Students 
for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., No. 1:14-cv-00954 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2014) 
(challenging the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s (“UNC-Chapel Hill”) admissions 
policy by claiming that race-neutral alternatives are available to UNC-Chapel Hill).   
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out possible lessons for how universities and other advocates of affirmative 
action could invoke diversity claims in a way that boosts equality more than 
it discourages it. 
I.  A PRELIMINARY TAXONOMY: EGALITARIAN, UTILITARIAN, AND 
DEMOCRATIC 
Between 1978 and 2016 five major Supreme Court cases had grappled 
with the value of diversity in higher education: Bakke in 1978, the Michigan 
cases challenging the undergraduate and law school’s admissions policies in 
2003, and the twice-reviewed Fisher case finally decided in 2016.  While some 
commitment to diversity can be traced more than a century back,26 diversity 
only began to factor into higher education law and policy significantly after 
Justice Powell introduced it as the primary justification for affirmative action 
in Bakke.27  Each of the cases that followed Bakke produced more than seventy 
amicus briefs expressing different perceptions about the value of diversity. 
Looking at diversity over this period of time, the Article reveals that its 
meaning was never fixed, but dynamic and constantly renegotiated.  More 
concretely, the Article uncovers two main historical transformations in the 
meaning of diversity: the first took place between Bakke and the Michigan 
cases, and the second took place between the Michigan cases and the Fisher I 
litigation.  In order to identify these shifts, the Article adopts a taxonomy that 
contrasts an egalitarian understanding of diversity with a utilitarian 
understanding.  I focus on these two poles of interpretation not only because 
of their dominancy, but also because they enable me to capture the 
significant changes in the meaning of diversity.  However, I recognize a third 
strand of interests in diversity, which I call the democratic meaning of diversity.  
This understanding articulates a national commitment to cultural pluralism 
as a democratic imperative.  While this dimension has stayed somewhat more 
constant over the years, its connection to egalitarian ideals faded between the 
Michigan cases and Fisher.  This taxonomy allows me to characterize the 
values that litigants, amici, and courts attributed to diversity, and to 
recognize when one set of values prevailed over the other. 
The proposed taxonomy adopts a traditional division from the 
philosophical literature between egalitarian and utilitarian rationales for and 
against affirmative action.  Egalitarian arguments are those which aim to 
promote or maintain a certain conception of equality (such as substantive or 
	
 26 DAVID B. OPPENHEIMER, ARCHIBALD COX AND THE DIVERSITY JUSTIFICATION FOR 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 10, 16 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913310 (tracing Harvard’s 
commitment to diversity all the way back to the beginning of the twentieth century); see also infra 
Part II and particularly infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra Part II and particularly infra notes 58, 71–72 and accompanying text. 
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formal, remedial or distributive, and so on).28  Utilitarian arguments are 
varied as well, but are basically concerned with maximizing the welfare of 
the majority.  Utilitarian aspirations are not simply instrumental or 
functional, but they seek to promote some kind social utility above all.29  
Although this is a generalized and abstract formulation of these two strands 
as “ideal types,”30 it emphasizes that while the former focuses on equality as 
a value inherent in diversity, for the latter diversity is a pure means to achieve 
other social goods that might align with, or be indifferent or even in 
opposition to, equality.  In what follows, a more nuanced and detailed 
taxonomy is presented, developed by drawing on both the theoretical 
literature and the actual arguments that appear in the amicus briefs and 
judicial opinions.  In Parts II, III and IV of the Article, the taxonomy is 
grounded in examples, as it is used to classify the dominant strands of values 
attributed to diversity along a spectrum of meanings, and to identify when 
one strand prevails. 
The egalitarian rationale for diversity can be divided into two main 
groups of values: remedial and distributive.  The remedial diversity framework 
appeals to notions of corrective justice.  It is mostly backward-looking, 
aspiring to diversity as part of the historical struggle to redress the persistent 
effects of past discrimination.  It aims to create a society in which members 
of historically disadvantaged groups enjoy the opportunities and status they 
would have had in life had they not been affected by the wrongs of the past, 
and in that sense it provides a kind of social remedy.  Originally, remedial 
rationales for affirmative action had compensatory elements.31  In its current 
formulation as an interest in diversity, the aspiration to ameliorate the 
unequal status quo caused by discrimination and segregation is motivated 
	
 28 See MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 116–32 (1991) (explaining how egalitarian arguments are used in the 
affirmative action debate). 
 29 See, e.g., id. at 95–132 (reviewing the different moral arguments for and against affirmative action 
developed in the literature); Buchan T.A. Love, Justifying Affirmative Action, 7 AUCKLAND U.L. REV. 
491, 492, 495 (1993) (categorizing the justifications for affirmative action into three main groups: 
“Equality of Opportunity,” “Distributive Justice,” and “Utilitarian Justifications,” the first two of 
which are egalitarian in nature and classified according to whether they aim to achieve equality of 
opportunity or of outcome). 
 30 Max Weber developed the analytical tool of “ideal types,” which serves to measure and identify the 
social phenomena in relation to a pure theoretical form of social construct.  It is meant to stress 
certain common elements of a phenomenon.  See Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social 
Policy, in MAX WEBER ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 90 (Edward A. Shils & 
Henry A. Finch eds., trans., 1949); see also Sung Ho Kim, Max Weber, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHIL. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weber/. 
 31 See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 137–41 (2010) (reviewing 
the compensatory rationale and explaining that “[i]n this model, if a person has suffered from 
wrongdoing, she is entitled to compensation from the wrongdoer, to the extent of the damages the 
wrong inflicted on her”). 
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mostly by a sense of collective or institutional responsibility towards 
historically disadvantaged groups.32 
The distributive diversity framework is forward-looking and focused on 
whether all people have a fair share of benefits, opportunities and status.33  It 
is rooted in the commitment to creating a society in which no group is 
systematically excluded from educational opportunities and positions of 
leadership.34  Under this justification, a diverse student body is a value in 
itself, as it embodies a more just distribution of those opportunities.  In some 
cases, this rationale is tied to the democratic understanding of diversity—
promoting a substantive vision of American democracy, under which all 
citizens are equals who enjoy equal opportunities and participation—on 
which I will elaborate later in this Part.35  For both egalitarian frameworks 
the main beneficiaries are disadvantaged groups (rather than the majority 
group, individuals, the society, or the market), and race is not a proxy for 
some other characteristic, but a central category of hierarchy and power.36  
In some instances, the two frameworks appear as complementary to one 
another, and in others they appear as independent interests in diversity. 
The anti-stereotyping strand of interest in diversity is also worth 
mentioning.  It aims to eliminate racial stereotypes and overcome racial 
divisiveness and isolation by increasing classroom diversity.37  Diversity here 
is valued for its potential to fight prejudice and bias by refuting stereotypes 
and stigmas.  When pursued for its own sake or as part of a larger struggle 
against discrimination, it should be understood as espousing an egalitarian 
goal.38  However, it is often the case that breaking down racial stereotypes 
and overcoming social divisiveness are pursued only with the utilitarian and 
market-driven motivations to promote a more efficient work environment 
and a better learning process.  As Ralph Richard Banks and Richard Ford 
extensively point out “[i]f people accept the eradication of unconscious bias 
	
 32 See infra Part III.A.1 and particularly infra notes 106–20 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra Part III.A.1 and particularly infra notes 121–25 and accompanying text. 
 34 The distributive rationale aims to eliminate group hierarchies and can thus be understood as 
espousing antisubordination values.  See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004) 
(explaining the distinction between an antisubordination and an anticlassification conception of 
equal protection).  
 35 See infra Part III.A.1 and particularly infra notes 126–31 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra Part III.A.1 and particularly infra notes 107–35 and accompanying text. 
 37 See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 83, 106 (2010) (tracing the origins of the anti-stereotyping principle to the civil rights 
movement: “The civil rights movement had long argued that stereotyping perpetuated racial 
subordination by curtailing the opportunities of racial minorities and helping to justify the rigid 
racial stratification of American society”); see also infra Part III.A.1 and particularly infra notes 101–
05 and accompanying text. 
 38 ANDERSON, supra note 31, at 144. 
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as the goal of racial reform . . . they would be likely to push the theory in 
directions that siphon energy away from problems of substantive inequality 
and that may be undesirable in their own right.”39  Thus, in order to classify 
the anti-stereotyping argument for diversity in one way or another, they must 
be read in context and with attention to the value they are meant to uphold. 
The utilitarian strand stresses the functional benefits that diversity affords 
society, individuals, or the economy.40  Rather than disadvantaged groups, 
the utilitarian vision targets beneficiaries with different characteristics that 
would contribute to the diversity of the institution.  It too can be divided into 
two dominant groups of arguments according to the type of good it aims to 
promote.  The first is pedagogical, and the second is what I call the business case 
for diversity.41  The pedagogical strand is focused on the benefits of diversity to 
the educational process of all students.  It is meant to promote the exchange 
of ideas and to foster a stimulating learning environment.42  The business case 
for diversity treats diversity as a means to achieve greater economic 
prosperity and efficiency at the levels of both society and the individual.43  It 
aims to prepare students for success in the diverse contemporary workforce.  
An increasingly global economy, it assumes, requires leaders and workers 
trained in a diverse environment.44  While distinct from one another, for both 
the educational and the market-oriented interests in diversity, race is a proxy 
for other elements, such as culture, identity, or ideas that would contribute 
to the diversity of the institution.  While the two strands were initially 
independent rationales, the Article shows that by the time of Fisher, the 
pedagogical arguments for diversity were mostly subjected to “greater” 
concerns about the market and the economic well-being of graduates.45  
Naturally these arguments are forward-looking and bear little or no 
relationship to the history of racial discrimination. 
	
 39 Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, 
and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1059 (2009); see also id. (further explaining that “[t]he 
unconscious bias discourse, for example, could lead either to the expanded use of diversity training, 
or the broad imposition of a norm of instrumentally rational decision making.  Neither would 
further the cause of racial justice”). 
 40 See ROSENFELD, supra note 28, at 94–115. 
 41 Another utilitarian interest invoked by the United States in Fisher I is the interest in well-functioning 
public institutions.  See infra notes 197–205 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra Part II and particularly infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 43 The business case for diversity is commonly used to describe justifications made by corporations to 
engage in diversity efforts for reasons of economic efficiency.  I import this term to the realm of 
higher education and use it to describe market-based rationales for diversity, focused mainly on 
professional training of students and on fostering an effective workforce.  For a discussion of the 
business case in the corporate context, see generally Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, 
Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 
AM. SOC. REV. 589 (2006). 
 44 See infra Part IV.A.1 and particularly infra notes 180–88. 
 45 See infra notes 186–88 and accompanying text. 
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A third dimension of diversity that does not necessarily fit neither to the 
egalitarian pole nor to the utilitarian one, is its democratic understanding that 
articulates a national ideology of cultural pluralism.  Duncan Kennedy 
explains that as a culturally pluralist society, we should deliberately structure 
institutions in a diverse way.46  This vision was best articulated by John 
Dewey in Democracy and Education: “democracy is more than a form of 
government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint 
communicated experience.” 47   Diversity, according to this view, is a 
manifestation of the democratic way of life.  It is a national-democratic 
commitment to cultural pluralism and “more numerous and more varied 
points of contact” and “a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual 
has to respond.”48  This vision of diversity is about pluralism as a democratic 
identity; it is an assertion about who we are as a nation.  It is thus somewhat 
distinct from both egalitarian and utilitarian strands of diversity.  However, 
both in theory and in the practice that is revealed by the amicus briefs,49 this 
deep commitment to democracy often overlaps with egalitarian 
commitments.  As Amy Gutman explains in her book Democratic Education: 
“[t]he principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination simultaneously 
support deliberative freedom and communal self-determination,” which are, 
according to Gutman, the foundation of democracy.50  “[A]ll citizens,” she 
continues, “must be educated so to have a chance to share in self-consciously 
shaping the structure of their society.”51 
The proposed taxonomy represents a spectrum of meanings, according 
to which I classify the values and interests attributed to diversity.  The 
egalitarian and utilitarian understandings of diversity mark the opposite ends 
of the spectrum, and the democratic dimension is external to this spectrum, 
but often it is aligned with the egalitarian pole.  The three poles of meanings 
attributed to diversity—egalitarian, utilitarian, and democratic—are neither 
completely distinct in theory nor are they always opposed in practice.52  The 
	
 46 Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 
713–14. 
 47 JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
EDUCATION 101 (1916). 
 48 Id. 
 49 See Part III.A.1 and particularly infra notes 126–31 and accompanying text. 
 50 AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 46 (1987). 
 51 Id. 
 52 For a theoretical discussion of equality as a utilitarian value, see Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in 
1 TANNER LECTURE ON HUMAN VALUES 198–99 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 2011) (1980)  
(explaining that “[u]tilitarian equality is the equality that can be derived from the utilitarian concept 
of goodness applied to problems of distribution. . . . The utilitarian objective is to maximize the 
sum-total of utility irrespective of distribution, but that requires the equality of the marginal utility of 
everyone — marginal utility being the incremental utility each person would get from an additional 
unit of cake. According to one interpretation, this equality of marginal utility embodies equal 
treatment of everyone’s interests” (footnotes omitted) (citing John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin 
Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’ Theory, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 594 (1975)). 
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egalitarian values of diversity were often instrumentalized to serve the 
“greater” benefits of maximizing social welfare, and more specifically of the 
economic prosperity of both the individual and of society.  Furthermore, the 
arguments in the amicus briefs are often entangled with one another and in 
some cases can be categorized as both utilitarian and egalitarian.  Analyzing 
numerous briefs, I am often able to distinguish one from the other, relying 
on rhetoric and nuanced context.  However, like other attempts at discourse 
analysis, the proposed sociohistorical account of diversity that follows 
acknowledges this complexity and aims to reflect it in the process of 
conveying the major transformations in the meaning of diversity that have 
occurred over time. 
II.  BAKKE’S CONSTRAINTS AND THE DIVERSITY FRAMEWORK 
In 1978, the Supreme Court in Bakke invalidated the University of 
California Davis Medical School’s admissions program that set aside sixteen 
places for minority students out of a class of one hundred.53  Disqualifying 
Davis’s specific program, Justice Powell, in a plurality opinion, actually 
approved the use of race in admissions if necessary to promote a “compelling 
state interest.”54  Applying strict scrutiny, Justice Powell questioned what 
State interests were sufficiently compelling.  He admitted that ‘‘[t]he State 
certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or 
eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified 
discrimination.’’ 55   However, Justice Powell distinguished between the 
legitimate narrow interest in ‘‘redress[ing] the wrongs worked by specific 
instances of racial discrimination’’ and the illegitimate goal of ‘‘remedying of 
the effects of ‘societal discrimination,’ an amorphous concept of injury that 
may be ageless in its reach into the past.”56  The interest in remedying past 
discrimination was thus sufficiently compelling only if a university could 
identify specific instances of institutional discrimination, but not to rectify 
broader social discrimination.  In so doing, Justice Powell narrowed the 
remedial logic to an extent it was no longer feasible to use in the realm of 
higher education.57 
Powell instead offered the diversity rationale.  ‘‘[T]he attainment of a 
diverse student body,” he held, is ‘‘of paramount importance’’ to the 
	
 53 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 54 Id. at 287–320 (plurality opinion). 
 55 Id. at 307. 
 56 Id.  
 57 Richard A. Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of “Affirmative Action,” 67 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 178–
80 (1979) (asserting that according to Justice Powell, remedial measures can only be based on 
legislative findings of past unlawful discrimination). 
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University’s mission and ‘‘compelling in the context of a university’s 
admissions program.’’58  Turning to the diversity rationale, Justice Powell 
relied on Harvard College’s admissions program, as described in an amicus 
brief filed by Harvard University, Stanford University, Columbia University, 
and the University of Pennsylvania.59  David Oppenheimer recently revealed 
that the diversity rationale embraced by Justice Powell in Bakke, was actually 
born in an amicus brief submitted by Harvard in a 1974 case that was 
dismissed by the court and forgotten.60  Furthermore, even though prior to 
Bakke, diversity generally did not serve as a justification for affirmative 
action,61  the roots of Harvard’s commitment to diversity, Oppenheimer 
shows, can be traced back to the mid-19th century.62  However, it was only 
following Bakke that diversity came to play the lead role in the struggle over 
affirmative action.  Justice Powell situated diversity as the preeminent 
justification for upholding race-conscious admissions policies, confining the 
legal debate and the popular discourse to the interest in diversity. 
As Pamela Karlan observed, Justice Powell conceptualized diversity as a 
pedagogical value in the educational process itself. 63   He focused on the 
“educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body,”64 
and explained that “the right to select those students who will contribute the 
most to the ‘robust exchange of ideas’” is important to the academic freedom 
of a university.65  Justice Powell added that “[t]he atmosphere of ‘speculation, 
experiment and creation’—so essential to the quality of higher education—is 
widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body.”66  Justice Powell’s 
interest in diversity, as John Jeffries observed, was about improving the 
educational experience of all students, rather than helping a specific group.67 
Above all, Justice Powell emphasized the pedagogical utility of diversity, 
but his interpretation of diversity also encompassed an interest in training 
	
 58 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311, 313–14 (plurality opinion). 
 59 Justice Powell attached Harvard’s program as an appendix to his opinion.  See id. app. at 321–24. 
 60 See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 26 at 1, 8 (explaining that the case DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 
(1974) was dismissed as moot). 
 61 Id. at 1–14. 
 62 Id. at 28–34. 
 63 Pamela S. Karlan, Compelling Interests/Compelling Institutions: Law Schools as Constitutional Litigants, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1624 (2007) (“Justice Powell’s articulation, grounded as it was in earlier cases 
involving academic freedom and autonomy, involved a largely intrinsic perspective in the sense that 
academic diversity was valuable to the university’s distinctive mission of promoting the robust 
exchange of ideas and the advancement of knowledge.”).  For a similar reading of Bakke, see Robert 
C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and 
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59–60 (2003). 
 64 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
 65 Id. at 312–13. 
 66 Id. at 312. 
 67 John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke Revisited, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7. 
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leaders and professionals.  “[T]he ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders 
trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse 
as this Nation of many peoples,”68  he stated.  This statement could be 
attributed to a democratic vision of society, yet Justice Powell did not follow 
this direction.  Instead, he seemed more interested in the pedagogical and 
somewhat market oriented utilitarian interest in diversity, as he asserted that 
a “student with a particular background—whether it be ethnic, geographic, 
culturally advantaged or disadvantaged—may bring to a professional school 
of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its 
student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding 
their vital service to humanity.” 69   Finally, he underlined that diversity 
“encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of 
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.”70 
Justice Powell’s opinion struck a compromise between the forces for and 
against affirmative action: it was permitted but restricted.  Even though it 
was not a majority opinion, it was widely viewed as stating the law and ended 
up shaping the conversation over affirmative action.71  Sanford Levinson 
explained how the Court sometimes establishes “law talk,” so that lawyers 
and non-lawyers adopt certain arguments and not others, and in Bakke, it was 
as if the Court ordered: stop talking about rectification of past social injustice 
and start talking about diversity.72   Critics of diversity draw a complete 
contrast between the rejected, backward-looking remedial interests in 
affirmative action and the new diversity justification.  Paul Mishkin criticized 
it on its “exclusive reliance upon the justification of academic diversity,”73 
	
 68 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (plurality opinion) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967)). 
 69 Id. at 314. 
 70 Id. at 315. 
 71 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (explaining that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke 
had “served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies.  
Public and private universities across the Nation have modeled their own admissions programs on 
Justice Powell’s views on permissible race-conscious policies”); see also Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 
The Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race”, 1979 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 147, 148 (“Justice Powell’s opinion, which we must work with as the law of the land, strikes 
me as an excellent compromise between two committees of the American Bar Association on some 
insignificant legislative proposal.  But it is thoroughly unconvincing as an honest, hard-minded, 
reasoned analysis of an important provision of the Constitution.”).  Nonetheless, the authority of 
Bakke as the law of the land was challenged by the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 
944 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), in which the majority struck down a race-
conscious admissions scheme and asserted that Bakke did not have the legal force that most lawyers 
had attributed to it. 
 72 See LEVINSON, supra note 5, at 16. 
 73 Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of 
Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 921 (1983).  Mishkin drafted the primary brief for the 
University in Bakke and argued that racial classifications in the context of affirmative action should 
be immune from strict scrutiny. 
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and Ronald Dworkin wrote that diversity “does not supply a sound 
intellectual foundation for the compromise the public found so attractive.”74  
Charles R. Lawrence added that “Powell’s restriction on backward-looking 
affirmative action incorporates the big lie into affirmative action doctrine,” 
explaining that the focus on diversity and the rejection of egalitarian 
rationales pushed us to believe that the nation has overcome its racism.75  
Others have claimed that by adopting diversity, affirmative action 
disconnected from its moral grounds, and that post-Bakke, minorities have to 
rely on the school’s interest in the benefits of diversity.76 
Focusing on legal doctrine, these critics describe the dispute over the 
justifications for affirmative action in binary and fixed terms: on the one 
hand, the lost remedial interest disqualified by Justice Powell, and on the 
other hand, the legitimate yet flawed interest in diversity.  This Article resists 
this binary contrast.  Instead, by investigating the briefs and amicus briefs 
filed to the Court in subsequent cases challenging higher education 
affirmative action, it shows that the meaning of diversity has been subject to 
continuous contestation and development.  It accounts for the overlooked 
conversation between social movements, university officials, and courts that 
have shaped the meaning of diversity and the way it was invoked to allow or 
restrict affirmative action over time.  By doing so, the Article uncovers that 
the debate over the competing defenses of affirmative action was actually not 
settled by the Court in Bakke or thereafter, but transformed into an internal 
and more covert negotiation over the value and significance of diversity.  
	
 74 Ronald Dworkin, The Bakke Decision: Did It Decide Anything?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, (Aug. 17, 1978), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1978/08/17/the-bakke-decision-did-it-decide-anything/ 
(“[T]he argumentative base of his opinion is weak.  It does not supply a sound intellectual 
foundation for the compromise the public found so attractive.  The compromise is appealing 
politically, but it does not follow that it reflects any important difference in principle, which is what 
a constitutional, as distinct from a political, settlement requires.”). 
 75 Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 768 
(1997); see also id. at 767 (“I call this ‘the Big Lie.’  Despite overwhelming evidence of continuing 
racial discrimination, the Court tells us our nation has overcome its racism.” (footnotes omitted) 
(citing Board Hopes to Destroy ‘Intractable’ Racism: U.S. Must Upgrade Its Worst Schools, Open Marketplace, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 15, 1997, at A3; then citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 76 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Introduction: Awakening after Bakke, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979) 
(“Where past intentional discrimination is not proved, post-Bakke minorities must rely on the 
interest of schools in exercising their discretion to admit a small number of minority students whose 
numbers will be dictated by the school’s interest in diversity, rather than on either the magnitude 
of past racial wrongs or on the minority students’ potential for future achievement.”). 
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III.  THE DEBATE OVER JUSTIFICATIONS CONTINUES IN GRUTTER AND 
GRATZ 
Several cases dealing with affirmative action in other spheres were 
decided by the Supreme Court in the decades following the Bakke decision,77 
yet it was only a quarter of a century later in Gratz v. Bollinger78 and Grutter v. 
Bollinger 79  (together the “Michigan cases”) that a challenge to higher 
education race-conscious admissions policies reached the Supreme Court.80  
The Michigan cases sparked widespread public mobilization for and against 
affirmative action and generated numerous amicus briefs.  The amicus briefs 
touched many aspects of the debate; some did not directly deal with the 
justification question, but almost all presented their own interpretation of the 
value of diversity.  It was the first time that the interest in attaining student 
body diversity was debated on a national scale, and therefore is the focus of 
this inquiry. 
The doctrinal analysis that has dominated the legal and popular 
scholarship on this body of law has mostly neglected to address this robust 
intervention.81  In contrast, drawing on democratic constitutionalism (also known 
	
 77 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
Federal Communications Commission, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), and imposing “strict scrutiny” on racial 
classification imposed by the federal government); Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 
497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990) (upholding a federal policy of racial preferences in broadcasting); City of 
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (declaring unconstitutional an ordinance 
that gave preference to minority-owned firms in awarding municipal construction contracts). 
 78 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003). 
 79 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003). 
 80 In 1996, the Fifth Circuit invalidated the University of Texas at Austin’s race-conscious admissions 
policy.  The University appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, which declined 
to review the case.  See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that that 
the University had discontinued and was no longer defending the specific admissions policy that 
had been at issue in the lawsuit), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033, 1034 (1996). 
 81 An exception is an analysis by Brown-Nagin of the mass mobilization surrounding the Michigan 
cases that manifested in the form of briefs and amicus briefs.  Yet, the focus of her inquiry is not 
diversity, but rather the relationship between social movements and juridical law.  In doing so, even 
Brown-Nagin’s account assumes a binary distinction between diversity and other egalitarian 
rationales.  Furthermore, the conclusions she draws regarding the tension between social 
movements and the law overlooks the evolving meaning of diversity that this article uncovers.  See 
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1436, 1502 (2005) (“[S]cholars [who conceive of litigation as an instrument of social 
reform] minimize the differences between the form and substance of legal processes and concepts, 
and the form and purposes of participatory democratic action.  In fact, there are profound 
differences between most forms and tactics of lawyering and social movement activity.”); see also 
David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The Rise of 
Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1553–
54 (2004) (examining the market-based arguments for diversity made by the business sector and its 
manifestation in the legal profession). 
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as popular constitutionalism) literature,82 the Article focuses exactly on the 
interaction between members of the polity and the Court that revealed itself 
in the form of an influx of amicus brief submissions.  The Article employs the 
idea that constitutional understandings are created not just through formal 
law-making, but also emerge in interactions between citizens, officials, and 
courts. 83   As Larry Kramer recognizes, democratic constitutionalism 
scholarship calls for a much-needed step away from the entrenched juris-
centric tradition. 84   In order to understand how constitutional norms 
develop, we must examine the ongoing engagement of other members of the 
polity in the process of constitutional interpretation. 85   Exploring this 
interaction between judicial and non-judicial actors in the context of 
affirmative action, this Article uncovers the evolving meaning of diversity.  It 
shows that diversity’s constitutional value was not only defined through 
Court opinions,86 but was also transformed and infused with new meanings 
	
 82 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 172 (2004) (making a normative claim regarding the rule of popular constitutionalism as 
a desirable methodology of constitutional interpretation, and arguing that the Court’s 
interpretation should be reflecting the popular will); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 
Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 6–10 (2001) (contrasting the notion of judicial 
supremacy with the idea of popular constitutionalism); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage: 
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007) (proposing a 
model of “‘democratic constitutionalism’ to analyze the understandings and practices by which 
constitutional rights have historically been established); Post, supra note 63, at 8 (explaining that 
constitutional culture “encompasses extrajudicial beliefs about the substance of the Constitution”); 
Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De 
Facto Era, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1325, 1341 (2006) (employing the term “constitutional culture” 
to explore how “changes in constitutional understanding emerge from the interaction of citizens 
and officials,” and explains that “[c]ollective deliberation helps establish what things mean and why 
they matter”).  For a review of the literature in the field, see Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 
1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1983) (describing how legal 
meaning is created, emphasizing that it does not require formal lawmaking); Larry D. Kramer, 
Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 960 (2004) [hereinafter Kramer, Popular 
Constitutionalism] (describing the “new discourse” among legal scholars to interpret the Constitution 
to appeal to democratic citizens). 
 83 See Siegel, supra note 82, at 1329 (using the term “constitutional culture” to describe how 
interactions between citizens and officials produce new constitutional meaning). 
 84 Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 82, at 959–60, 965–66.  Reviewing this body of 
literature, Kramer explains that after Brown, constitutional scholars on both sides of the aisle came 
to accept the judiciary as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and started debating over 
the question of interpretative methodology.  This, he argues, lead the literature to focus on courts 
and neglect external influences that shape constitutional law.  The scholarly movement of 
democratic constitutionalism, Kramer recognizes, is a much-needed step away from this tradition. 
 85 Id. at 993. 
 86 There are many other theories that embrace the idea of a dynamic “living constitutionalism.”  
However, these theories tend to focus on the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, evolving 
from one decision to another.  Democratic constitutionalism takes the idea of a living constitution 
one step further and accounts for the complex ways in which changes in constitutional meaning 
take place through the interaction between judicial and extra-judicial actors.  For a key theory of 
living constitutionalism, see generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
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through the public conversation that revolved around these cases.  In what 
follows, I uncover this conversation through a textual analysis of the 
numerous amicus briefs that were filed by different actors: university officials, 
student organizations, public interest groups, veterans, the United States 
Government, and others.  But first, the facts of the cases. 
The University of Michigan (for this section: “U-M” or the “University”) 
first adopted race-conscious affirmative admission measures in the 1960s.  In 
1991 Lee Bollinger, then the president of the University, set in motion steps 
to reframe the University’s affirmative measures in terms of diversity so that 
they would align with Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. 87   At the 
undergraduate level preference points were automatically allocated to 
applicants of disadvantaged minority groups.88  In contrast, the law school 
had in place an individualized holistic review process, under which race was 
only one of many factors that may contribute to diversity. 89   In 1997, 
plaintiffs represented by the Center for Individual Rights (“CIR”) challenged 
the University’s admissions policies both at the undergraduate level and at 
the law school.90  The litigation climaxed in two Supreme Court cases, Gratz 
and Grutter, which were heard in conjunction and decided in 2003.91 
By the time the cases reached the Supreme Court, social mobilization 
around them was unprecedented in content and in scope, and produced 
seventy-one amicus briefs in support of the university and sixteen in support 
of the petitioners.92 
A.  The Emergence of the Egalitarian Diversity Framework in the Briefs 
In Bakke, Justice Powell rejected the goal of remedying the effects of 
societal discrimination, while allowing limited use of race in admission 
decisions to promote the benefits of diversity to the educational process.93  
	
 87 Wendy Parker, The Story of Grutter v. Bollinger: Affirmative Action Wins, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES 
83, 86–87 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2007) (“In 1991 . . . Dean Lee 
Bollinger . . . . appointed a faculty committee to devise an affirmative action policy consistent with 
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion. . . . The policy asserted that diversity would improve learning for all 
students. . . . To achieve this, the law school sought to enroll ‘a “critical mass” of minority 
students.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821, 828 (E.D. Mich. 
2001), rev’d 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.) (en banc), aff’d 539 U.S. 306 (2003))). 
 88 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (“Here, the Law School engages in a highly 
individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file. . . . Unlike the program at issue in 
Gratz . . . the Law School awards no mechanical, predetermined diversity ‘bonuses’ based on race 
or ethnicity.” (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271–72 (2003))). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. 
 91 Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. 
 92 For a complete list of amicus briefs submitted in both Grutter and Gratz, see Grutter and Gratz: Amicus 
Briefs, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN ADMISSIONS LAWSUITS, https://diversity.umich.edu/ 
admissions/legal/amicus.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2017). 
 93 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310–12 (1978) (plurality opinion).  
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Following the University of Michigan’s defense, the vast majority of the amici 
in the two cases seemingly complied with the constraints set by Bakke and did 
not openly invoke direct remedial rationales.  However, a careful analysis of 
the amicus briefs reveals that their interpretation of diversity, in contrast to 
Justice Powell’s, was infused with egalitarian interests.  Bakke was both 
criticized and praised for rejecting the remedial logic and settling the debate 
over justifications for affirmative action.  Yet, as I demonstrate below, the 
debate over the rationales for affirmative action was not over, but rather 
transformed into an internal and more covert conversation over the value of 
diversity.  Bakke closed the main door for egalitarian arguments for 
affirmative action.  But, by resisting the narrow pedagogical interpretation of 
diversity and infusing it with prospective and retrospective egalitarian values, 
the proponents of affirmative action opened a window through which the 
conversation could continue.  In other words, if diversity was introduced as 
a form of compromise that allowed affirmative action to continue but 
mystified its egalitarian aspirations,94 the Grutter amici curiae reappropriated 
it to include remedial as well as distributive egalitarian values. 
Many of the amicus briefs filed in the Michigan cases cited Bakke and 
encompassed similar utilitarian and pedagogical understandings of diversity, 
aspiring to achieve educational benefits and greater goods for society at large.  
However, at the same time, the briefs were deeply rooted in the history of 
racial discrimination.  Distinct not only from Bakke, but also from the 
contemporary, market-driven, ahistorical interpretation of diversity, the 
Michigan amici viewed diversity as a concept that vindicates a deep concern 
for the persistence of racial inequality.  Studying the briefs, I identify that the 
Michigan amici attributed three types of egalitarian interpretations to 
diversity, each focused on a different kind of interest: (1) anti-stereotyping 
interests, (2) retrospective remedial interests, and (3) prospective distributive 
interests, entangled, in large part, with a democratic vision of society.  Of 
course, not all of these interests can be found in each brief, and the balance 
between the utilitarian defense of diversity and the equality-based defense 
varies.  Nevertheless, those three strands of egalitarian meaning were present 
and salient in the interpretation of diversity at the time of the Michigan cases.  
First, I consider the defense of the University of Michigan that served as a 
point of reference for many of the amici.  Then, with a focus on the academic 
amici, I analyze amicus briefs filed in support of the University.  Finally, I 
supplement this account through analysis of the way diversity is reflected in 
the briefs submitted by the petitioners and their supporters. 
	
 94 Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1723 
(2005) (“Powell allowed universities to admit members of previously disadvantaged groups without 
having to state directly that they were remedying past societal discrimination.”). 
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1. Proponents’ Briefs and the Egalitarian Interests in Diversity 
The University of Michigan asked the Court to reaffirm Justice Powell’s 
opinion in Bakke.  Formally complying with the constraints set in Powell’s 
opinion, the University defended its race-conscious affirmative action 
policies solely in terms of diversity, cautious not to admit it had any direct 
interest in prohibited racial balancing or any remedial motivations.95  This 
approach led U-M to recognize the same utilitarian, mostly pedagogical, 
benefits of diversity that were emphasized by Justice Powell.96  Even with 
such a literal and cautious approach, diversity for U-M was not based solely 
on the utilitarian—pedagogical and to a lesser extent market-driven—
rationales that it was in Bakke.  For U-M, the interest in diversity was deeply 
connected to the history of race discrimination and the persistence of racial 
hierarchies.  When claiming that Powell’s opinion in Bakke is not only a 
binding precedent but also legally “justified,” U-M explained that “[d]espite 
noble aspirations and considerable progress, our society remains deeply 
troubled by issues of race.  Against that backdrop, there are important 
educational benefits—for students and for the wider society—associated with 
a diverse, racially integrated student body.”97  Similarly, when explaining 
that race-conscious measures to promote diversity have “durational limits,” 
the University turned to remedial logic and argued that the disparities in 
academic preparation that make race-neutral alternatives impossible today 
are “rooted in centuries of racial discrimination” and that these disparities 
“will eventually be eliminated.”98  The University further claimed that the 
goal of diversity:  
simply acknowledges the elephant in the room—that despite the recent 
advent of formal equality under the law and indisputable progress in race 
	
 95 See Brief for Respondents at 12, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter 
Brief for Respondents, Grutter] (arguing that Bakke is a “settled precedent,” that it “has been relied 
upon by universities for decades . . . and has become an important part of our national culture.  It 
is also clearly correct”). 
 96 Id. at 21–22 (“[P]reparing students for work and citizenship in our diverse society is exceedingly 
difficult in racially homogenous classrooms . . . . ‘[R]acially integrated education improves the quality 
of education for all children’ . . . and . . . ‘is beneficial to both’ white and minority students.” (quoting 
H.R. Rep. No. 92-576, at 10 (1971); then quoting S. Rep. No. 92-61, at 7 (1971))).  In oral arguments, 
the University’s attorney also claimed that “our leaders need to be trained . . . with exposure to the 
viewpoints, to the prospectives [sic], to the experiences of individuals from diverse backgrounds.”  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-214). 
 97 Brief for Respondents, Grutter, supra note 95, at 12; see also Brief for Respondents at 25, Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents, Gratz] (“Racial and 
ethnic diversity is educationally important because, notwithstanding decades of progress, there 
remain significant differences in our lives and perceptions that are undeniably linked to the realities 
of race.  Continuing patterns of residential segregation, for example, mean that ‘the daily events 
and experiences that make up most Americans’ lives take place in strikingly homogenous settings.’” 
(quoting Joint Appendix at 1968, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1447))). 
 98 Brief for Respondents, Grutter, supra note 95, at 33. 
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relations (in part because of the growing racial diversity in institutions like 
the Law School), America remains both highly segregated by race and 
profoundly and constantly aware of its significance in our society.99 
The connection between the utilitarian push for diversity and the 
egalitarian interpretations of it only deepened in the vast majority of amicus 
briefs submitted in support of the University.  The coalition of amici was 
mainly composed of representatives of university officials, student 
organizations, K-12 organizations, civil rights organizations, retired military 
generals, and businesses and professional organizations.  Academic amici 
and other supporters followed the lead of the University of Michigan.  Many 
of them defended the efforts to promote diversity by pointing to the role and 
prerogative of institutions of higher education as they prepare students to be 
productive and successful members of society and of the ever-expanding 
global workforce.100  But, even though many recognized the utilitarian—
pedagogical and market-driven—benefits that flow from diversity, their 
interpretation of diversity was deeply entangled with notions of racial justice, 
equality, and democracy.  With the exception of business amici, the 
supporters’ interpretation of diversity was rooted in and expressed three 
kinds of egalitarian values. 
a. Anti-Stereotyping Interests 
The first—yet least common—of the egalitarian interests to show up in 
the briefs was the interest in breaking down racial stereotypes.   A few of the 
academic amici claimed that classroom diversity has the potential to 
eliminate racial stereotypes and overcome racial divisiveness.  Few of the 
amici emphasized the advantages of eliminating stereotypical assumptions 
both to the educational experience and to the multicultural work 
	
 99 Id. at 23 (further explaining that “[m]any white Americans underestimate those realities because, 
of course, ‘[t]o be born white is to be free from confronting one’s race on a daily, personal, 
interaction-by-interaction basis.’  By contrast, ‘[t]o be born black is to know an unchangeable fact 
about oneself that matters every day’” (alterations in original) (quoting T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A 
Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1066 (1991))). 
 100 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Columbia Univ. et al. in Support of Respondents at 3, Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Columbia Brief, Grutter] (“Anyone learns 
better in an environment that includes other students who bring a different background and 
perspective to the same experience or material. . . . This will provide the ferment and creative 
excitement that is itself part of a good education and will prepare them to participate in a world 
which promises to be very different from that any of us have experienced.” (quoting Nannerl O. 
Keohane, The Mission of the Research University, in THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY IN A TIME OF 
DISCONTENT 164 (Jonathan R. Cole et al. eds., 1994))); Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Council on 
Educ. & 53 Other Higher Educ. Orgs. in Support of Respondents at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 
02-214) [hereinafter ACE Brief, Grutter] (“Diversity is basic to higher education’s main purposes: to 
enable students to lead ‘the examined life’; to ready them to maintain the robust democracy in 
which we live; and to prepare them to function in the national and global economy.”). 
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environment. 101   However, the majority of amici who invoked the anti-
stereotyping interests understood it as an egalitarian value.  Some of them 
did not find a need to further justify the interest to overcome stereotypes as 
they found it a good in itself,102 and for others it was part of the overall fight 
against prejudice and bias that lead to discrimination.103  The American 
Federation of Labor, for example, argued that “[a]mong the most clearly 
documented educational benefits of the diverse student body . . . is the 
reduction of stereotypes and prejudices that lead to discrimination.” 104  
Similarly, an amicus brief filed by thirty-eight private colleges and 
universities connected anti-stereotyping to discrimination, and to a national 
commitment of cultural pluralism:   
[i]t is very much a part of our educational mission to expose our students to 
differences in race, gender and class . . . to teach them to recognize and 
overcome bias, prejudice and discrimination, so that they may understand 
that our diversity creates our richness and strength as a nation and as a 
people.105 
	
 101 See, e.g., Brief of Harvard Univ. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Grutter, 539 
U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Harvard Brief, Grutter] (“Amici’s admissions policies have served 
compelling pedagogical interests by contributing to a diverse and inclusive educational experience, 
teaching students to view issues from multiple perspectives, and helping to break down prejudices 
and stereotypical assumptions.  The policies prepare students to work productively in a multiracial 
environment after they graduate, and the policies meet the demands of business and the professions 
by preparing a generation of public and private leaders for an increasingly pluralistic national and 
global economy.”). 
 102 See, e.g., Brief of the Am. Educ. Research Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
20, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“[S]tudent body diversity overwhelmingly leads to positive 
outcomes and helps dispel the racial stereotyping that has plagued American society throughout its 
history.”); ACE Brief, Grutter, supra note 100, at 25, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“[T]he 
educational value of diversity derives not from a false assumption that all members of one race think 
alike or that race is a proxy for viewpoint.  Rather, diversity enables students to discover the falsity 
of such stereotyped, malignant assumptions.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Asian Pac. Am. Legal 
Consortium et al. in Support of Respondents at 10 n.4, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (explaining 
that diversity is “necessary to avoid precisely the sort of stereotyping that Petitioners decry.”). 
 103 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae the Am. Jewish Comm. et al. in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter, 
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“Our nation’s history has been marred by centuries of racial and ethnic 
prejudices and wrongdoings.  As Jews, who have often been the victims of such prejudices, we value 
the importance of equality. . . . In that spirit, and in recognition of the value of a diverse campus 
community, [the Central Conference of American Rabbis] supports the carefully crafted programs 
at issue here.”). 
 104 Brief Amicus Curiae of Am. Fed’n of Labor & Congress of Indus. Orgs. in Support of Respondents 
at 2, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241); see also id. (“White, African-American and Hispanic students 
schooled with diverse peers are more likely to work in integrated workplaces.  Thus, the challenged 
admissions policies further the compelling governmental interest in equal employment 
opportunity.”). 
 105 Brief of Carnegie Mellon Univ. et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14–15, Grutter, 
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) [hereinafter CMU Brief, Grutter]. 
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b. Retrospective Egalitarian Framework: Remedial Interests 
More salient was the backward-looking remedial interest in attaining 
student body diversity.  The most explicit link between remedial interests and 
diversity was made in an amicus brief by The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights, who argued that “[t]he Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act provide a compelling remedial interest and inform a diversity 
interest.”106  They explained that “given not only the complex and torturous 
history of race in this nation, but the contemporary social, political, cultural, 
and economic realities it has shaped, race is not simply a matter of skin color 
or features.”107  Careful not to explicitly advocate for the rejected separate 
remedial defense of affirmative action, many amici interpreted diversity to 
include a version of these remedial values.   To name but one example of 
many,108 the National School Boards Association argued that “[r]acial and 
ethnic gaps in educational opportunity and achievement persist across the 
nation.  Closing these gaps is a compelling national priority that may 
necessitate race-conscious policies, including efforts to promote diversity or 
prevent racial isolation.”109 
 Academic amici were even more cautious not to openly invoke explicit 
remedial justification for taking race-based measures.  Through their 
interpretation of diversity, however, they vindicated clear interests in fighting 
the persistent effects of past discrimination and situated their current pursuit 
of diversity in relation to the history of state-sanctioned discrimination and 
the struggle to end it.110  The United Negro College Fund simply stated:  
	
 106 Brief of Amici Curiae the Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law et al. in Support of 
Respondents at 5 n.3, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516). 
 107 Id. at 28. 
 108 For non-academic briefs, see, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae Black Women Lawyers Ass’n of Greater 
Chi., Inc., in Support of Respondents at 29, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“[W]hen will this 
use of race to achieve diversity end? . . . We will know that we have reached that point when a child 
born black has the same opportunity in America as a child born white in America.  We will have 
reached that day when research reflects that there is no economic disparity in America based upon 
race for individuals similarly situated.”); Brief Amici Curiae of Veterans of the S. Civil Rights 
Movement & Family Members of Murdered Civil Rights Activists in Support of Respondents at 2, 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“[E]fforts to promote . . . diversity . . . [are] needed so America 
can continue its progress toward becoming a society in which all have a fair opportunity to 
participate.” (alteration in original)). 
 109 Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Sch. Bds. Ass’n et al. in Support of Respondents at 20, Grutter, 539 U.S. 
306 (No. 02-241) (footnotes omitted) (citing Dear Colleague Letter from Secretary Richard Riley, 
U.S. Department of Education, (Jan. 19, 2001); then citing No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 
U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2002); and then citing Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 
738, 742–53 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 110 See, e.g., Brief of Howard Univ. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 39–40, Grutter, 539 
U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“The fact that the University gives considerable weight to race and ethnicity 
in the admissions process in order to achieve diversity and ameliorate the effects of discrimination 
is both necessary, if it is to be a real factor, and unsurprising given the profound and 
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“[t]he racial exclusion, segregation, and discrimination that, for centuries, 
permeated all aspects of the Nation’s educational system . . . are significant 
to understanding the compelling nature of the governmental interest in 
admitting a diverse student body and the benefits to both individuals and 
society of ensuring educational opportunity for all . . . .”111 
Similarly, Amherst and twenty-seven fellow prestigious colleges 
emphasized the close relationship between their contemporary efforts to 
promote student diversity and “the commitment to broadly include students 
from groups which had been systematically disadvantaged and effectively 
excluded . . . .”  The Colleges claimed that “[t]he interest in educating 
students from all reaches of American society . . . has deep roots, and cannot 
be dismissed as late-twentieth century social engineering.”112  After describing 
their long history of employing diversity efforts, a group of elite universities, 
including Harvard, Yale, and Brown, stated that it was against this “historical 
backdrop that selective universities ultimately developed their admissions 
policies with respect to African-Americans and other minority groups that 
have been subject to targeted exclusion from many of the benefits of American 
life.”113  The academic coalition not only tied their interest in diversity to the 
saliency of past discrimination, but also directly pointed to the remedial 
potential of attaining diversity.  As the American Law Deans Association 
explained:  “[r]acial diversity eliminates racial identifiability; racial 
identifiability is important evidence of segregation and discrimination . . . .”114 
The Student Intervenors Coalition115 defended U-M’s policy by arguing 
	
intergenerational effects of two hundred and fifty years of slavery, followed by a century of Jim 
Crow, followed by slow progress in the face of continuing discrimination.”); Harvard Brief, Grutter, 
supra note 101, at 29 (“[T]he interest in a racially diverse student body might gradually become 
decoupled from policies that give favorable consideration to minority race and ethnicity.”).  Even 
in briefs that followed Justice Powell’s opinion more rigidly or focused not on diversity itself but on 
the deference that should be given to the university, the unique and unparalleled commitment to 
racial and ethnic representation, to the representation of “minority groups” or “disadvantaged 
groups,” was exceptional.  See, e.g., Columbia Brief, Grutter, supra note 100, at 4 (“[O]ne factor 
amongst the multitude it considers in its admissions process should be the race and ethnic 
background of otherwise underrepresented minorities.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Mass. Inst. of Tech. 
et al. in Support of Respondents at 24, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“We must not pretend 
that racial discrimination against minorities is no longer an issue in the United States.”). 
 111 Brief for the United Negro Coll. Fund & Kappa Alpha Psi as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241). 
 112 Brief of Amherst et al. Amici Curiae, Supporting Respondents at 19, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-
241). 
 113 Harvard Brief, Grutter, supra note 101, at 10. 
 114 Brief of Am. Law Deans Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter, 539 U.S. 
306 (No. 02-241). 
 115 Brief for Respondents Kimberly James et al., Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) [hereinafter 
Kimberly James Brief, Grutter] (filed on behalf of three groups: United for Equality and Affirmative 
Action (“UEAA”), Law Students for Affirmative Action (“LSAA”), and the Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action and Integration and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (“BAMN”)). 
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that traditional admission criteria were discriminatory, and that affirmative 
action was required “to undo some portion of the odious impact that its two 
main admissions criteria would otherwise have on the fairness of its 
admissions process as well as the diversity of its student body.”116  Promoting 
this argument, it treated diversity as a defective but necessary compromise 
that had to be upheld.117  The Student Coalition recognized that diversity 
“obscured affirmative action’s fundamental nature as a means of achieving 
integration and equality,”118 but at the same time realized that it is the only 
way the Court “can sanction the right of universities to continue equalizing 
educational opportunity, can make universities more accountable to the 
public, and can provide much needed protection of the gains towards 
integration this society has made.”119  The Student Coalition, as well as other 
student intervenors, embraced a remedial interpretation of diversity, while 
accepting that such compromise might narrow the historical aspiration to 
rectifying the wrongs of the past.  By acknowledging the indirect and limited 
nature of the diversity compromise and yet recognizing its potential to 
eliminate racial discrimination, they charged the diversity interest with 
remedial values.120    
c. Prospective Egalitarian Framework: Distributive Interests and the 
Democratic Understanding of Diversity 
The predominance of forward-looking interests in diversity in the briefs 
filed in the Michigan cases is not surprising.  In Bakke, diversity was framed 
as a future-oriented interest,121 and this was considered to be a major element 
of its persuasive force.122  It is only natural that the briefs trying to convince 
the Court to affirm Bakke have followed this line.  However, it is surprising 
	
 116 Id. at 19. 
 117 Id. at 17 (“To most Americans, uniting the nation on the basis of Justice Powell’s conception of 
diversity merged easily with the aspirations inspired by Brown to unite the nation on the basis of 
integration. . . .  [P]rogress toward an integrated nation could continue, slowed down, on the 
indirect paths Justice Powell had sanctioned even if not on the direct road to freedom.  Even with 
all its limitations, . . . Justice Powell’s decision has met the test of history.”). 
 118 Id. at 30. 
 119 Id. at 30–31. 
 120 See Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of a Comm. of Concerned Black Graduates of ABA Accredited 
Law Schs.: Vicky L. Beasley et al. in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-
241) (“Programs that promote diversity serve a compelling state interest because they correct the 
systematic ways in which the traditional admissions criteria afford racial preferences . . . .”); see also 
Brief on Behalf of Hillary Browne et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Grutter, 
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“Diversity is a compelling governmental interest because it furthers the 
goal of societal integration articulated in Brown and provides students who lived in racial isolation 
prior to entering college with the opportunity to interact with students of different races.”). 
 121 See supra Part II and particularly supra notes 63–69. 
 122 See LEVINSON, supra note 5 (suggesting that diversity should be valued for its ability to transform the 
future, rather than as a way to remedy the past). 
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that while for Justice Powell most of these forward-looking interests in 
diversity were utilitarian and emphasized its pedagogical benefits, the 
Michigan amici presented an additional forward-looking interpretation, an 
egalitarian one.  For the Michigan amici, the utilitarian interests were 
present, but not exclusive; instead, they were strongly tied to the distributive 
value of diversity and its potential to promote equal citizenship and a 
pluralistic vision of American democracy.  For instance, the Harvard brief 
stated that: 
[H]ighly selective universities have long defined as one of their central 
missions the training of the nation’s business, government, academic, and 
professional leaders.  By creating a broadly diverse class, amici’s admissions 
policies help to assure that their graduates are well prepared to succeed in 
an increasingly complex and multi-racial society.  The policies also make 
certain that no racial or ethnic group is excluded from that vital 
process[,] . . . ensuring that minorities are not excluded from the professions 
and positions of future leadership.123 
This excerpt shows that, for elite universities at the time of the Michigan 
cases, utilitarian interests in diversity were entangled with distributive values—
concerned with just distribution of opportunity and status, as well as with 
democratic values—committed to cultural pluralism.  A group of state 
universities have also emphasized the distributive value of diversity:  
“‘ensur[ing] that the full range of opportunities [it provides] are accessible to 
all segments of an increasingly diverse society’ and ‘[e]nhancing 
opportunities for enrolling, retaining, and graduating students from 
underrepresented groups.’”124  These arguments can also be associated with 
the principle of anti-subordination, as they reflect an interest in making sure 
that no group is systematically excluded from positions of civic leadership.125  
For other academic amici, those distributive benefits were part of a democratic 
vision of diversity.  “By breaking down barriers,” the American Council on 
	
 123 Harvard Brief, Grutter, supra note 101, at 3, 12 (emphasis added); see also CMU Brief, Grutter, supra note 
105, at 7 (“Equal opportunity for citizens of all races does not require indifference to race; instead, it 
requires appreciation and mutual respect that can only be achieved through productive and robust 
interaction.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Judith Areen et al. in Support of Appellants’ Appeal for Reversal 
of the District Court Order at 19–20, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-
1447) [hereinafter Law School Deans Brief, Grutter] (“[E]ven under the Court’s strict scrutiny 
analysis, judges could distinguish between a race-conscious ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a race-
conscious ‘welcome mat.’” (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995))). 
 124 Brief of the Univ. of Pittsburgh et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, Grutter, 539 
U.S. 306 (No. 02-241). 
 125 For a discussion of the antisubordination and anticlassification principles, and their manifestation 
in equal protection jurisprudence, see Siegel, supra note 34, at 1472–73, explaining that the 
anticlassification principle “embraces a particular conception of equality, one that is committed to 
individuals rather than to groups,” and prohibits all identity-based classifications, regardless of their 
goal.  By contrast, the antisubordination principle is based on “the conviction that it is wrong for 
the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed 
groups.”  Id. 
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Education (“ACE”) argued, “diversity advances a chief purpose of higher 
education . . . because ‘[a] democracy is more than a form of government; it 
is primarily a mode of associated living.’” 126   Diversity, they added, is 
necessary “to prepare students for citizenship.  An educated citizenry is the 
predicate of a thriving democracy.”127  Finally, the ACE brief asserts that 
“[t]he Founders saw higher education as essential to train the nation’s leaders 
who, John Adams held, should be recruited not from among ‘the rich or the 
poor, the highborn or the low-born, the industrious or the idle; but all those 
who have received a liberal education.’”128  This brief and others articulated 
a national commitment to cultural pluralism as the democratic way of life.129  
The democratic meaning attributed to diversity could have been categorized 
as an independent interpretation of diversity, but a close reading reveals that 
it actually entailed a vision of equal citizenship.  According to this vision, 
students are “democratic equals” 130  and no group is excluded from 
educational opportunities and future leadership positions.131 
The distributive and democratic interests in diversity were dominant not 
only among academic amici, but also among other groups of the Michigan 
amici.  Non-academic amici, such as governmental officials and civil rights 
organizations, also considered diversity a tool to “create a pipeline of racially 
diverse leaders” and foster “the fuller participation of previously dispossessed 
segments of our society.”132   A group of congressmen argued the benefits of 
diversity include “the enhanced economic, social and political participation 
of racial minorities” and explained “[i]n a democratic system, a group of 
	
 126 ACE Brief, Grutter, supra note 100, at 20–21 (quoting JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 
101 (1916)). 
 127 Id. at 17–18. 
 128 Id.  at 21 (quoting John Adams, in THE JOHN ADAMS PAPERS 182 (Frank Donovan ed., 1965)). 
 129 See e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Sch. of Law of the Univ. of N.C. Supporting Respondent at 7, 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“The State of North Carolina knows, in short, that its future 
statewide leadership cohort should be, and inevitably will be, racially and ethnically diverse.”). 
 130 Brief of Amici Curiae Judith Areen et al. in Support of Respondents at 10, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 
(No. 02-241) (“[I]ntegrated education advantages all students in a distinctive way, by bringing rich 
and poor, black and white, urban and rural, together to teach and learn from each other as democratic 
equals.” (emphasis added)). 
 131 Harvard Brief, Grutter, supra note 101, at 3–4 (arguing that it is “legitimate for universities to concern 
themselves with ‘ensur[ing] that [they] are open to all individuals and that student bodies are 
educationally diverse and broadly representative of the public.’” (quoting Brief of the United States 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-
516))); see also Brief of Am. Law Deans Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“Failure to educate a leadership class among disadvantaged 
minority populations would be a permanent threat to equality and social stability.”). 
 132 Brief for the NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. & the ACLU as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 6, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241); see also Brief of King Cty. Bar Ass’n as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10–11, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“The Coalition’s 
mission is to increase ethnic diversity in the legal profession so that our courtrooms and law offices 
better reflect the communities they serve.”). 
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citizens must be able to obtain their government’s assistance in preserving 
access to the ‘transactions and endeavors that constitute life in a free 
society.’”133  Another group of congressmen tied diversity to the ideal of equal 
representation and explained that “[t]he Constitution also breathes life into 
this principle of equality and the importance of diversity in its framework for 
a democratic system of government.  Our country was founded on the 
principles of democracy and representational government.”134  While there is 
no doubt that these interests have utilitarian benefits, the Michigan amici 
focused on ideals of equal participation and representation, which they valued 
independently, regardless of their social function and potential benefits. 
Finally, in a very influential brief by a group of retired military officers, it 
was claimed that “a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps educated 
and trained to command our nation’s racially diverse enlisted ranks is 
essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide 
national security.”135  First, as Douglas Laycock argues, it is important to 
notice that this brief argues not that military officers need to be educated in 
a diverse classroom, but the much broader and seemingly democratic claim 
that the officer corps in itself needs to be racially diverse.136  This brief is hard 
to classify.  On the one hand, it makes functional claims for the necessity of 
diversity for the military effectiveness and ability to fight.  These could be 
classified as utilitarian, but they seem to also entail a vision about a military 
in a democratic society.  At the very least, as the brief itself notes, an 
“indivisible link existed between military efficiency and equal 
opportunity.”137  Diversity, it asserted, is “critical to both the operational 
efficiency of the military and to the creation of the more just and equal 
environment.”138  For the retired generals, the utilitarian benefits of diversity 
were deeply connected to its egalitarian value.  
The only amicus briefs not dominated by the egalitarian interpretations 
of diversity were those of the business amici.  For them, diversity was a 
business interest.  Classroom diversity, they argued, is necessary for 
effectively training students for the increasingly heterogeneous and global 
workforce.139  Educational diversity, they added, is a step in promoting the 
	
 133 Brief of John Conyers, Jr., Member of Congress et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 
at 4, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). 
 134 Brief of Representative Richard A. Gephardt et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241.) 
 135 Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 5, 10–13, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) [hereinafter The Military Brief]. 
 136 Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, Academic Excellence, and Future 
Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1772 (2004). 
 137 The Military Brief, supra note 135, at 11. 
 138 Id. at 17. 
 139 Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading Am. Buss. in Support of Respondents at 5, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 
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business interest in a workforce that reflects the nation’s diversity.140  But 
even these naturally utilitarian amici, in some briefs, recognized the 
persistency of past and present racial discrimination and attributed 
significance to the promotion of diversity and inclusion of racial and ethnic 
minorities.141 
Thus, although some amici emphasized utilitarian interests, the 
dominant interpretation of diversity at the time of the Michigan cases 
vindicated egalitarian values.  The amici supporting race-conscious 
affirmative action understood diversity to be deeply connected to the struggle 
for racial equality:  fighting racial stereotypes, remedying the effects of past 
discrimination, and working for a more just distribution of civic 
opportunities. 
2.  Opponents’ Briefs Mirror the Egalitarian Interpretation 
For the plaintiffs and their public interest counsel—the Center for 
Individual Rights (“CIR”)—as well as for amici opponents of affirmative 
action, the question of whether diversity is a compelling interest was still 
open.142  They argued that “diversity is simply too indefinite, ill-defined, and 
lacking in objective, ascertainable standards to be fitted to narrowly-tailored 
measures.” 143   However, some of the opponents’ amicus briefs either 
accepted diversity as a compelling interest or were willing to accept it for 
purposes of the discussion.144  In so doing, these briefs serve as a mirror to 
	
(No. 02-241) [hereinafter 65 Businesses Brief, Grutter] (“Because our population is diverse, and 
because of the increasingly global reach of American business, the skills and training needed to 
succeed in business today demand exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and 
viewpoints.”); Brief of Gen. Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter, 
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) [hereinafter General Motors Brief, Grutter] (“[O]nly a well educated, 
diverse work force, . . . can maintain America’s competitiveness in the increasingly diverse and 
interconnected world economy.”). 
 140 See Brief of Amici Curiae Media Cos. in Support of Respondents at 5, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 
02-241) (“From a purely business perspective, a diverse workforce is essential to amici’s success. . . . 
The communities served by the media increasingly reflect multiple racial and ethnic backgrounds.  
Individuals in these communities are likely to choose a broadcast station or newspaper where the 
programming reflects the diversity of the community.”). 
 141 See 65 Businesses Brief, Grutter, supra note 139, at 8 (“Whatever methodology is employed to select 
those who will be afforded the opportunity to obtain the best education and training available in 
America today, that methodology must operate in such a way that students of all races, cultures 
and ethnic backgrounds are in fact meaningfully included.”); see also General Motors Brief, Grutter, 
supra note 139, at 8–9 (“[A]n individual can only experience racial or ethnic discrimination based on 
his or her race or ethnicity; and endeavoring to include in a law school class individuals who have 
actually experienced the kind of racial or ethnic discrimination being discussed in class requires 
consideration of race in admissions.”). 
 142 Brief for the Petitioner at 34, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (arguing that diversity as an 
educational benefit is distinct and inapplicable to the Court’s compelling interest analysis). 
 143 Id. at 17. 
 144 See, e.g., Brief of the State of Fla. & the Honorable John Ellis “Jeb” Bush, Governor, as Amici Curiae 
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claims made by the University of Michigan and its supporters.  They raised 
questions regarding the value of diversity and challenged the claim that the 
diversity rationale is distinct from remedial motives.145   
The Bush Administration submitted an amicus brief objecting to the 
University’s use of race in its admissions programs.  The Administration 
acknowledged the legitimacy of diversity as a compelling interest, yet argued 
that there are ample race-neutral alternatives to achieve it.146  The interest 
in diversity it identified was thoroughly connected to ideals of equality.  The 
brief opened with the following statement:  “[e]nsuring that public 
institutions, especially educational institutions, are open and accessible to a 
broad and diverse array of individuals, including individuals of all races and 
ethnicities, is an important and entirely legitimate government objective,” 
and questioned if the chosen policies are really necessary “to ensure that 
minorities have access to and are represented in institutions of higher 
learning.”147  It appears that, to the United States government, diversity was 
first and foremost an interest in equal access and participation of previously 
excluded groups.  Other opposition amici made similar claims and reiterated 
the connections between diversity and equality. 148    Thus, despite their 
objection to race-conscious affirmative action, several opponents attributed 
egalitarian values to diversity.  In part, these are surely strategic claims that 
aim to blur the distinctiveness of diversity and undermine its legitimacy, yet 
they also reflect that the interest in diversity was, at the time, deeply 
connected to ideals of equality. 
B.  Justice O’Connor’s Opinion: Diversity, Democracy, and Equal Opportunity 
The Michigan cases affirmed the use of race in higher education 
admissions policies and were celebrated by proponents of affirmative 
action.149  Even though the Court invalidated the undergraduate admissions 
	
in Support of Petitioners at 20, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Florida Brief, Grutter] 
(“Even assuming that the diversity that the University of Michigan is attempting to achieve 
constitutes a compelling state interest, its race-conscious admissions policies are not narrowly 
tailored to accomplish that interest.”).  
 145 Id. at 21–22 (“The justification for diversity based solely upon a public policy argument, without a 
showing that it is necessary to correct past discrimination, is insufficient to meet the compelling 
interest requirements.” (emphasis altered)). 
 146 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13–18, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 
(No. 02-241) [hereinafter United States Brief, Grutter] (arguing that “[n]o segment of society should 
be denied an opportunity to obtain access to government services and public institutions,” but 
offering a list of race-neutral alternatives to achieving diversity). 
 147 Id. at 8, 19. 
 148 See, e.g., Florida Brief, Grutter, supra note 144, at 2 (“Florida has provided alternative but race-neutral 
means of admission to those students who are striving for excellence, but who may have been 
disadvantaged by a lack of educational opportunities.”). 
 149 See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Affirmative Action; Justices Back Affirmative Action by 5 to 4, but 
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policy in Gratz,150 in both cases diversity was found to be a compelling state 
interest that can justify some uses of race classifications.  In Gratz, the majority 
of the Court decided that the University’s admissions policy was not narrowly 
tailored to achieve educational diversity, but that for the reasons set forth in 
Grutter, diversity is a compelling state interest.151  In Grutter, the Court upheld 
the law school’s holistic admissions policy and affirmed that it has “a 
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.”152 
The interpretative framework set by the amici in the Michigan cases was 
reflected in the Court’s opinion in Grutter, as the Court appears to have 
identified at least three goals that diversity promotes: 
The first goal is the utilitarian pedagogical and market-driven objective 
of preparing students for the workforce.  Citing the amicus brief filed by the 
American Educational Research Association, the Court noted that, 
“diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better prepares students for an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as 
professionals.’” 153   The “skills needed in today’s increasingly global 
marketplace,” the Court emphasized, “can only be developed through 
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”154  This 
can clearly be identified as a forward-looking utilitarian interest in the 
professional success of all students and the wellbeing of society at large. 
Second, the Court acknowledged anti-stereotyping benefits of diversity and 
explained that it “promotes ‘cross-racial understanding’” and helps to “break 
down racial stereotypes,”155 but for Justice O’Connor, these benefits were 
“important and laudable,” not only in themselves, but also because 
“‘classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more 
enlightening and interesting’ when the students have ‘the greatest possible 
variety of backgrounds.’”156  It is unclear if such benefits can independently 
	
Wider Vote Bans a Racial Point System, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/ 
06/24/us/supreme-court-affirmative-action-justices-back-affirmative-action-5-4-but-wider.html 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2018) (“The rulings today came as an enormous relief to the civil rights 
community, as well as to public and private colleges and universities around the country, dozens of 
which had joined briefs supporting Michigan.”). 
 150 In Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003), by a 6–3 decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for the majority, held that the University’s policy “which automatically distributes 20 
points . . . needed to guarantee admissions, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ 
applica[tion], solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational 
diversity that respondents claim justifies their program.”  
 151 Id. at 268, 275; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (“[W]e endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body 
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”). 
 152 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
 153 Id. at 330 (quoting Brief of the Am. Educ. Research Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 246a, 244a, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)). 
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justify the use of race-based measures, but it is apparent that for the Grutter 
Court, race was more than just another element of difference that could 
contribute to the utilitarian benefits of diversity. 
The third and most dominant objective the Court attributes to diversity is 
the prospective value in sustaining the American democracy. 157   This 
conception of democracy was committed to cultural pluralism as a national 
ideology, but it was also inseparably entangled with an egalitarian vision of 
society and its institutions.  Diversity, the Court observed, is necessary to 
sustain “our political and cultural heritage,” 158  because “[e]ffective 
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of 
our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be 
realized.”159  More practically, in explaining the interest in diversity, the 
Court referred to the United States amicus brief and asserted that 
“[e]nsuring that public institutions are open and available to all segments of 
American society, including people of all races and ethnicities, represents a 
paramount government objective.”160  Furthermore, the Court charged that 
the interest in diversity is the interest in ensuring that the “path to leadership” 
is “visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity.”161  “All members of our heterogeneous society,” the Court stated, 
“must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational 
institutions that provide this training,” which is necessary in order to cultivate 
leaders with “legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.”162 
It seems that Grutter establishes equal opportunity as a central justification 
for diversity, but its focus on legitimacy creates some ambiguity.  It is possible 
that legitimacy can be assured without actual diversity, but with the mere 
appearance of openness.  But it seems more plausible to infer that Grutter 
asserts an interest in the openness of institutions of civil participation as an 
independent and democratic social good advanced by diversity. 163   As 
Pamela Karlan recognized—by relying on amicus briefs that explicitly 
invoke the rejected “interest in reducing the historic deficit of traditionally 
disfavored minorities,” “Grutter marks a significant expansion of the concept 
	
 157 Post, supra note 63, at 60–61. 
 158 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331. 
 159 Id. at 332 (emphasis added). 
 160 Id. at 331–32 (quoting United States Brief, Grutter, supra note 146, at 13). 
 161 Id. at 332. 
 162 Id. at 332.  In other parts of the opinion, Justice O’Connor acknowledges the wrongs of past 
discrimination without recognizing the interest in remedying past discrimination.  See, e.g., id. at 
337–38 (“With respect to the use of race itself, all underrepresented minority students admitted by 
the Law School have been deemed qualified.  By virtue of our Nation’s struggle with racial 
inequality, such students are both likely to have experiences of particular importance to the Law 
School’s mission, and less likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore those 
experiences.”). 
 163 For an interesting discussion, see Post, supra note 63, at 60–61. 
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of diversity as a compelling interest.”164  Similarly, Reva Siegel identified that 
“Grutter transforms the diversity rationale in the course of adopting it, 
expanding the concept of diversity so that it explicitly embraces 
antisubordination values . . . [by which] no group is excluded from participating 
in public life and thus relegated to an outsider, or second-class status . . . .”165  
Influenced, so it appears, by the prospective egalitarian interpretations 
suggested in the amicus briefs, the Grutter Court considered diversity to be an 
interest in ensuring that no group is systematically excluded from higher 
education and from positions of influence in society.  The Court’s interest in 
diversity was thus not a merely utilitarian interest in the benefits of civic 
participation, training leaders, and maintaining legitimacy, but an interest in 
equal opportunity to participate and to lead—an interest in equal citizenship.166 
In other words, for the Grutter Court, diversity was a forward-looking 
democratic value in the equal distribution of educational opportunities.  Jack 
Greenberg argues that the Court’s eye was “on the condition of society and 
what affirmative action can do to help fix it, not what caused the 
condition.” 167   But did it also embody the backward-looking remedial 
interpretation of diversity that was eminent in the amicus briefs?  The answer 
to that is less clear, but appears to be positive in two ways.  First, by 
embracing an antisubordination perspective and emphasizing the role of 
higher education in promoting the “[e]ffective participation by members of 
all racial and ethnic groups,”168 the Court seems to have recognized the 
persistence of racial inequality, as well as the existing asymmetry between 
opportunities available to minority groups and those available for the 
majority groups, and the need to fight it.  Second, by insisting on the 
temporality of the need to take diversity efforts and expecting that “25 years 
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further 
the interest approved today,”169 the Court seemed to vindicate some form of 
remedial perspective.  Whatever is wrong with the current situation of 
students’ attainment will be fixed in time by taking measures to diversify the 
schools.  Thus, the time-limitation requirement, Robert Post explains, only 
makes sense if the justification for diversity is quasi-remedial.170  Grutter, then, 
contains this tension between a strong prospective orientation, and 
	
 164 See Karlan, supra note 63, at 1626 (referring to Justice O’Connor’s strong reliance on arguments 
presented by amicus briefs that explicitly adopted some of the egalitarian justifications for 
affirmative action previously rejected by Justice Powell in Bakke). 
 165 See Siegel, supra note 34, at 1538–39. 
 166 For a similar interpretation of Grutter, see Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown and Grutter: A Play in Three 
Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1719 (2005) (“[T]he Court argues that affirmative action is 
necessary for individuals to secure equal opportunity. . . .”). 
 167 Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1610, 1621 (2003). 
 168 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 , 332 (2003). 
 169 Id. at 343. 
 170 Post, supra note 63, at 67 n.306. 
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recognition of the unique disadvantage of racial minorities in entering 
institutions of higher education. 
Despite this strong egalitarian interpretation of diversity set forth by the 
Grutter Court, in the following years the conversation about diversity 
continued and its meaning was narrowed dramatically to utilitarian values, 
primarily concerned with educational and economic benefits. 
IV.  DIVERSITY’S TRANSFORMATION IN FISHER I 
The admissions policy at the University of Texas at Austin (“UT”) is an 
outcome of years of litigation.  After UT’s race-conscious admissions policy 
was banned in 1996,171 the Texas legislature adopted the “top ten percent 
plan.”  Under this program, the top ten percent of the graduating classes of 
each high school in the state were automatically admitted to UT.  Taking 
into account the segregation in the public school system, this plan was meant 
to promote racial and ethnic diversity.172  Following the Grutter decision, UT 
implemented an additional individualistic admissions plan, under which the 
university considered, among many other factors, the race of applicants not 
admitted through the percentage plan in order to increase diversity.173  In 
Fisher I, the Petitioner argued that UT’s consideration of race in reviewing 
individual applicants was unconstitutional because the university had a race-
neutral alternative.174  The Fifth Circuit upheld the policy.175 
A.  The Takeover of Utilitarian Diversity in the Briefs 
Fewer than ten years separated the Michigan cases from the Fisher 
litigation, but the meaning of diversity seems to have changed immensely 
during that time.  Part III of this Article demonstrates that the Grutter Court 
adopted a more robust interpretation of diversity that included egalitarian 
perspectives.  But the Fisher amici—comprised of seventy-three amici curiae 
in support of UT and seventeen in support of the Petitioner—turned in a 
different direction.176  Closely analyzing these briefs, I find that the amici in 
Fisher I mostly pursued the business case for diversity.  
For the amici in Fisher I, diversity was a utilitarian value, mostly divorced 
from ideals of equality and racial justice.  And thus, in the 2010s, diversity 
was no longer interconnected with remedial and distributive ideals, but 
	
 171 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). 
 172 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013). 
 173 Id. 
 174 Brief for Petitioner at 20–21, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). 
 175 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 176 For a complete list of amicus briefs submitted in both cases, see Fisher vs. UT Austin: U.S. Supreme 
Court (2011), UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, 
https://legal.utexas.edu/scotus-2011 (last visited Apr. 11, 2018). 
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instead its interpretation reflected pedagogical and mostly economic utility, 
such as preparing students to succeed in a heterogeneous society and building 
a more effective workforce.  The egalitarian and democratic aspects of 
diversity did not disappear completely, but they were scarcer and mostly 
subjugated to utilitarian goals, such as professional training or the economic 
wellbeing of society.  The interest in ensuring that “the path to leadership be 
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals,” as articulated by Justice 
O’Connor in Grutter,177 was, naturally, often cited in the briefs.  However, 
these references were mostly instrumentalized for promoting external 
interests, such as the unity of society or productivity of the market rather than 
equality in itself.   
1.  Proponents’ Briefs and the Utilitarian Interests in Diversity 
In its brief, UT declared that the objectives of the program are the 
educational benefits flowing from a diverse student body.  This kind of 
diversity, UT made clear, is composed not just of race but of a far broader 
array of qualifications and characteristics, “including geographic diversity, 
socioeconomic diversity, cultural diversity, and so on.”178  UT stated that 
diversity is in the “[n]ation’s paramount interest in educating its future 
leaders in an environment that best prepares them for the society and 
workforce they will encounter.”179  The interest in diversity, the University 
explained, “includes an ‘academic environment’ in which there is ‘a robust 
exchange of ideas, exposure to differing cultures, preparation for the 
challenges of an increasingly diverse workforce, and acquisition of 
competencies required of future leaders.’”180  While these arguments seem to 
have a democratic dimension committed to cultural pluralism, it is important 
to notice that these are not normative arguments about who should our 
leaders be or how diverse should the society be, but functional arguments 
concerned with the utilitarian interest of training students in an environment 
that best prepares them for life in the diverse society and workforce.  UT’s 
brief was not devoid of references to equality,181 but these notions were scarce 
and mostly subject to utilitarian benefits.  For example, when asked to 
explain why the policy favors African-Americans and Hispanics, UT argued 
that “[b]y virtue of our Nation’s struggle with racial inequality,” such 
students are likely to have experiences of particular importance.182   UT 
	
 177 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003). 
 178 Brief for Respondents at 25, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). 
 179 Id. at 3. 
 180 Id. at 39 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 181 Id. at 40 (mentioning for the first and last time UT’s responsibility “in ensuring that ‘the path to 
leadership be visibly open . . . .’” (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. 332)). 
 182 Id. at 44 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338) (arguing that UT’s diversity policies comply with Supreme 
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added that “[j]ust as growing up in a particular region or having particular 
professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s 
own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, 
in which race unfortunately still matters.”183  Thus, race and the struggle for 
equality were a kind of commodity for UT; they mattered, but as another 
element of identity that comprises diversity for the purpose of promoting 
utilitarian benefits. 
The majority of academic amici was even less (and some hardly at all) 
interested in the egalitarian interpretation of diversity, as they were focused 
on its utilitarian benefits.  Diversity, for these amici, was composed of both 
pedagogical and market-driven interests, yet it seems that the educational 
mission itself has changed and became more focused on professional training 
rather than on the educational process in itself.  State universities, the Ivy 
League schools, 37 liberal arts colleges, and other universities argued that 
their goal—as institutions of higher education—is to prepare the leaders of 
tomorrow for the ever-growing multicultural world, and that classroom 
diversity is necessary in achieving this task.184  The American Council on 
Education, for example, claimed that “a purpose of higher education is to 
equip professionals and business leaders to interact with diverse customers, 
clients, co-workers, and business partners,”185 and that this need to prepare 
students for “[t]he ever-thickening web of economic, political, and social ties 
	
Court precedent). 
 183 Id. (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333). 
 184 See, e.g., Amherst Brief, Fisher I, supra note 2, at 29 (“The inescapable realities of increased diversity 
in the country and growing global interconnectedness have led amici colleges to incorporate the 
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[hereinafter Brown Brief, Fisher I] (“Diversity encourages students to question their assumptions, to 
understand that wisdom and contributions to society may be found where not expected, and to gain 
an appreciation of the complexity of the modern world.  In these ways, diversity bolsters the unique 
role of higher education in ‘preparing students for work and citizenship’ and training ‘our Nation’s 
leaders’ for success in a heterogeneous society.” (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331, 332)); Brief Amici 
Curiae of Fordham Univ. et al. in Support of Respondents at 5, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-
345) (quoting the University of San Francisco’s “mission . . . to advance a ‘diversity of perspectives, 
experiences and traditions as essential components of a quality education in our global context.’”); 
Brief of Leading Public Research Univs. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14, 
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) [hereinafter Brief for Leading Public Research Univs., Fisher 
I] (quoting the University of Kansas’ “vision of diversity” for a learning environment which 
“provides our students valuable experiences that will help them prosper after graduation in an 
increasingly global and multicultural world.”); Brief for the Howard Univ. Sch. of Law Civil Rights 
Clinic as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 26, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) 
(“[D]iversity provides students a wider range of perspectives as to the material they study in their 
classes and better prepares them for the world they will encounter upon graduation.”). 
 185 Brief of Amici Curiae American Council on Educ. and 39 Other Higher Educ. Orgs. in Support 
of Respondents at 10, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) [hereinafter ACE Brief, Fisher I]. 
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between nations” makes diversity even more compelling today. 186  
Moreover, Dean Martha Minow of Harvard Law School and Dean Robert 
Post of Yale Law School focused on the pedagogical value of diversity and 
the atmosphere of speculation it cultivates, as well as its market-oriented 
benefits.  They emphasized the importance of diversity for “preparing 
students for the practice of law in today’s increasingly globalized and 
heterogeneous economic world.”187  Diversity, it was explained, benefits not 
only individuals but “society as well, for it fosters the development of citizens 
and leaders who are creative, collaborative, and able to navigate deftly in 
dynamic, diverse environments.”188  These examples—invoking conceptions 
of citizenship and leadership—seem to entail pluralistic and democratic 
interests in diversity.  However, as we can see, they are largely 
instrumentalized to achieve other social functions, rather than embody any 
egalitarian ideal of remedy or distribution.  Furthermore, many academic 
amici added lengthy explanations—in part grounded in social science—
about how all “students benefit from a robust exchange of ideas and exposure 
to different cultures,”189 emphasizing the benefits of diversity to the majority 
group. 
Some universities tried to explicitly distance their interest in diversity 
from remedial aspirations and positioned their efforts as completely 
utilitarian.  A brief submitted by a number of elite universities, including 
Stanford, Harvard, and Yale, explained: 
The compelling governmental interest in diversity in higher education is 
quite different from remedying generalized discrimination.  The issue here 
is whether, in assessing diversity, a university may take into account the need 
(a) to foster conditions for providing the most stimulating learning 
environment possible and (b) to train effectively citizens and leaders for a 
heterogeneous society.190  
Citing Grutter, some academic amici did call for the removal of barriers 
and opening pathways to leadership, but this democratic objective was 
mostly meant to serve superior pedagogical or economic utilities, such as 
	
 186 Id. at 8. 
 187 Brief of Dean Robert Post and Dean Martha Minow as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 
at 8, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) [hereinafter Brief of Dean Robert Post and Dean Martha 
Minow, Fisher I]; see also Brief for the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n at 3, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-
345) (“To remain effective the legal profession must reflect the changing demographics of the 
United States’ population.” (emphasis altered)). 
 188 Brown Brief, Fisher I, supra note 184, at 9. 
 189 See, e.g., Brief of Dean Robert Post and Dean Martha Minow, Fisher I, supra note 187, at 13 (arguing 
that diversity “will enrich the educational experience of all” through the clash of perspectives); Brief 
for Leading Public Research Univs., Fisher I, supra note 184, at 6 (“Current research continues to 
show that student bodies diverse in a multitude of ways lead to improved learning outcomes for all 
students and benefit the entire educational community.”). 
 190 Brown Brief, Fisher I, supra note 184, at 27. 
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promoting learning outcomes and preparing students for life and work in an 
increasingly diverse society.191  In other words, they were interested in the 
social utility that a diverse citizenry can produce, rather than in the 
egalitarian value of a diverse citizenry itself.  Among the benefits of diversity, 
several academic amici also mentioned overcoming stereotypes and 
promoting cross-racial understanding.  These benefits, however, had almost 
no intrinsic egalitarian value, and were meant to allow collaboration and thus 
serve the greater good of society.192  Similarly, when the saliency of race was 
acknowledged or past discrimination mentioned, it was mostly to explain 
how racial diversity, like any other cultural difference, identity, and personal 
background, can contribute to the diversity of viewpoints and experiences.193 
	
 191 Brief for California Institute of Technology et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 11–
12, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (“All students benefit as ‘productive inquiry best 
takes place when individuals can explore and share their experience and thoughts as equal members 
of our community, uninhibited by prejudice or discrimination.’” (quoting Univ. of Rochester, 
Statement of Educational Philosophy, http://www.rochester.edu/diversity/philosophy (last visited Aug. 9, 
2012))); ACE Brief, Fisher I, supra note 185, at 16 (“Removal of barriers is thus the essence of American 
higher education, necessary both for personal growth and the continued growth of the 
Nation[,] . . . because such a society produces ‘more numerous and more varied points of contact’ 
and ‘a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to respond.’  Inculcating not only ‘an 
ability’ but also ‘an inclination’ ‘to serve mankind, one’s country, friends and family . . . .’” (quoting 
JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 101 (Free Press 1966) (1916); then quoting 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE EDUCATION OF YOUTH IN PENNSYLVANIA 
30 (William Pepper ed., Univ. of Pa. Press 1931) (1749))); Brief of Amicus Curiae Soc’y of Am. Law 
Teachers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 
11-345) [hereinafter Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers Brief, Fisher I] (“the ‘path to leadership be visibly 
open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity . . . so that all members of our 
heterogeneous society may participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and 
education necessary to succeed in America.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 308, 332–33 (2003))).  These examples sounds completely democratic and even 
egalitarian, yet in the following sentence the amici continue to argue that “[i]f American businesses 
are to achieve a highly qualified and diverse workforce with individuals who have been exposed to 
different perspectives, individuals of various races and ethnicities must be granted access to higher 
education.”  Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers, Fisher I, supra at 12. 
 192 See e.g., Brief of the Am. Educ. Research Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
2–3, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (“[S]tudent body diversity leads to 
important educational benefits.  Among these benefits are improvements in intergroup contact and 
increased cross-racial interaction among students; reductions in prejudice; improvements in cognitive 
abilities, critical thinking skills, and self-confidence; greater civic engagement; and the enhancement 
of skills needed for professional development and leadership.”); Brief of Appalachian State Univ. et 
al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) 
(“Higher levels of cross-racial interactions on a campus . . . ‘better prepare[ ] students for an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331)). 
 193 Brief for Amicus Curiae Ass’n of Am. Law Schools in Support of Respondents at 24, Fisher I, 133 
S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (“It remains inescapably true that members of racial minorities 
often possess experiences and perspectives not shared by their white peers. . . . Token minority 
representation will not produce the kind of learning environment that fosters an excellent legal 
education.”); Brown Brief, Fisher I, supra note 184 at 11 (“To say that race continues to matter is to 
acknowledge forthrightly that, for many reasons—including the frustrating persistence of 
segregated schools and communities—race continues to shape the backgrounds, perspectives, and 
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The most prominent exception to this trend of utilitarian diversity was an 
amicus brief submitted by a group of constitutional scholars,194 explaining 
that Grutter’s interpretation of diversity allows “forward-looking measures 
that call for the sensitive use of race to foster equality in education.”195  It is 
in light of this exception that we can see what the vast majority academic 
amici were “missing.”  Thus, at the time of Fisher I, the connection between 
diversity and equality had been loosened and the utilitarian benefits that flow 
from diversity were portrayed as the superior mission of higher education.  
The history of racism was ignored and the persistence of racial hierarchies 
was mystified, as race became just one of many elements of applicants’ 
identity that can promote robust discussions and enhance the level of 
training. 
This strong trend away from the egalitarian approach for diversity was 
only amplified by non-academic public amici.  The United States asserted that 
diversity is absolutely necessary for military and federal agencies to fulfill 
their missions.196  Building a diverse force is nothing less than a strategic 
imperative,197 and a diverse officer corps is essential for officers’ ability to lead 
the enlisted ranks.198  “[T]o be effective,” the United States added, “we have 
to look like America.  We have to understand and reflect the communities 
we serve.”199  These interests, “including military readiness, [and] national 
security,” the brief added, “will be more readily achieved if the pathways to 
professional success are visibly open to all segments of American society.”200  
These interests, the brief continues, are “not simply a matter of civic 
responsibility; it is a pressing necessity in an era of intense competition in the 
global economy and ever-evolving worldwide national-security threats.”201  
Thus, while this brief vindicates a pluralistic vision of America, unlike the 
	
experiences of many in our society, including Amici’s students.”). 
 194 Brief Amici Curiae of Constitutional Law Scholars & Constitutional Accountability Ctr. in Support 
of Respondents at 21, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). 
 195 Id. at 20–21 (“Grutter recognized that it is constitutionally permissible to take race into account to 
ensure that ‘the path to leadership be visibly open’ . . . [and] Grutter held that the government may 
enact forward-looking measures that call for the sensitive use of race to foster equality in education.” 
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332, 333)). 
 196 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 
2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) [hereinafter United States Brief, Fisher I]. 
 197 Id. (quoting DEP’T OF DEF., DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION STRATEGIC PLAN—2012 TO 2017 3 (2012), 
http://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/DoD_Diversity_Strategic_Plan_%20final_as%2
0of%2019%20Apr%2012%5B1%5D.pdf). 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 15 (quoting Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI, Speech at the National Conference of the 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities: FBI Diversity Employment in a New Age of Global 
Terror (Sept. 17, 2002), (transcript available at https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/speeches/fbi-
diversity-employment-in-a-new-age-of-global-terror) (last visited Apr. 11, 2018)). 
 200 Id. at 10. 
 201 Id. at 5–6. 
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strong connection between democracy and equality that was evident in 
Grutter, in Fisher I the democratic dimension was linked and even secondary 
to utilitarian interests.  For the United States at the time of Fisher I, the 
interest in diversity was no longer an interest in “[e]nsuring that public 
institutions, especially educational institutions, are open and accessible to a 
broad and diverse array of individuals, including individuals of all races and 
ethnicities,”202 as it was at the time of Grutter.  Instead, diversity was now an 
interest in a well-functioning military and administration, and equality was a 
byproduct, but not a goal.  Thirty-seven former high-ranking officers and 
civilian leaders of the military added that a diverse officer corps is crucial for 
the effectiveness of the military because it is more likely to carry cultural 
sensitivity and foreign language skills to succeed in today’s wars.203  Other 
public amici, such as a group of congressmen, several states, and a number 
of senators held a similar interpretation of diversity.204 
Aside from a few limited exceptions that articulated the connections 
between diversity and equality, 205  the vast majority of amici curiae 
supporting UT’s race-conscious admissions policy held a utilitarian—
pedagogical and mostly market-oriented—interpretation of diversity. Civil 
society organizations, student organizations, affinity groups, and businesses 
emphasized repeatedly that educational diversity is a utilitarian value, meant 
to improve the quality of education206 and to prepare graduates to be better 
	
 202 United States Brief, Grutter, supra note 146, at 19. 
 203 Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9–10, 
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). 
 204 See e.g., Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Fisher 
I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (“[D]iverse educational community enriches the learning 
environment for all students and better prepares them to excel in a heterogeneous world.”). 
 205 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Coal. of Bar Ass’ns of Color in Support of Respondents at 9–12, 
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (articulating both a strong utilitarian interpretation of 
diversity, emphasizing how diversity benefits all sectors of legal profession, and an egalitarian one, 
and explaining how diversity and representation in the legal profession promotes fairness and access 
to positions of public leadership); Brief of the Advancement Project as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Respondents & Urging Affirmance at 3, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (“UT’s 
quest for a racially diverse student body is justified, in part, because it represents an attempt by UT 
to come to terms with its own history of purposeful discrimination and the history of purposeful 
discrimination by the state of Texas.”); Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of the Coal. to Def. Affirmative 
Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (“BAMN”) 
et al. in Support of the Respondents Urging Affirmance at 5–6, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 
11-345) (presenting an independent egalitarian defense for race-conscious affirmative action not 
tied to an interest in equality or diversity). 
 206 For further examples, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Former Student Body Presidents of Univ. of Tex. 
at Austin in Support of Respondents at 22, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) 
(“[D]iversity, including diversity of race, socioeconomic class, and national origin, translated into a 
broad range of opinions that made classes ‘worth attending.’); Brief of Amicus Curiae Teach For 
America, Inc.  in Support of Respondents at 4–5, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) 
(“History and research show that students from all backgrounds are best served when their 
classrooms and schools are led by a diverse staff of teachers and principals. Yet without a diverse 
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and more effective members of society, as workers or leaders.207  This interest 
could also be understood as invested in promoting minorities, but the amici 
only rarely referred to minorities as beneficiaries of diversity policies, as they 
emphasized instead the benefits of an effective workforce and of the quality 
of education for all.  Furthermore, some amici even made clear that the 
benefit of diversity “extends beyond simply developing minority leaders” or 
other egalitarian interests, to the positive effects on the society at large.208  
They portrayed diversity as an interest in training students to successfully fit 
in the workforce and promote the economic well-being of the state and the 
nation.209   Equality might be a means to achieving these goals, or their 
byproduct, but it was no longer a goal in itself. 
2.  Opponents’ Briefs Mirror the Utilitarian Interpretation   
The Petitioner in Fisher I and several of her supporters did not challenge 
the diversity rationale, but argued that UT’s goal in considering race was not 
promoting diversity, but rather the unconstitutional interest in racial 
balancing.210  By doing so, they explained what they considered to be the 
legitimate interest in diversity: “an inward-facing concept of diversity focused 
on enhancing the university experience,” 211  educational dialogue and 
exchange of ideas “by keeping minority students from feeling ‘isolated or like 
spokespersons for their race.’”212   This claim was, of course, a strategic 
	
pipeline of graduates from the nation’s leading colleges and universities, our schools will struggle to 
recruit the heterogeneous cadre of leaders they badly need.”); Brief for Amici Curiae  Fortune-100 
and Other Leading American Buss. in Support of Respondents at 2, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) 
(No. 11-345) (“For amici to succeed in their businesses, they must be able to hire highly trained 
employees of all races, religions, cultures and economic backgrounds. It also is critical 
to amici that all of their university-trained employees have the opportunity to share ideas, 
experiences, viewpoints and approaches with a broadly diverse student body. To amici, this is a 
business and economic imperative.”). 
 207 See, e.g., Brief of Former Student Body Presidents, supra note 206, at 20 (“These educational benefits 
include, among other things, creating an environment in which a ‘robust exchange of ideas’ can 
occur by promoting cross-racial understanding, breaking down racial stereotypes, reducing 
isolation that can result in a lack of participation by minorities, better learning outcomes, and better 
preparation of students to enter a diverse workforce and society in today’s increasingly global 
marketplace.”). 
 208 Brief of Distinguished Alumni of the Univ. of Tex. at Austin as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 2, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). 
 209 See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Small Bus. Owners and Ass’ns in Support of Respondents at 3–4, 
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (“The ability of small businesses to adapt quickly to 
changing market conditions – including changes in the demographic make-up and global nature of 
the market – has proven a necessary component of their success. This distinctive feature of small 
business, however, requires continuing access to a workforce ‘trained through wide exposure’ to the 
ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”). 
 210 Brief for Petitioner at 19, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). 
 211 Id. at 26. 
 212 Id. at 27 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319 (2003)); see also Brief for Amici Curiae 
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argument trying to narrow the interest of diversity.  However, it also indicates 
that, at the time of Fisher I, opponents of race-conscious affirmative action 
acknowledged diversity to be a compelling interest, but only as long as it is 
meant to promote the quality of education. 
B.  Fisher I and the Missing Egalitarian Interpretation 
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit on the application of strict 
scrutiny standard of review, demanding a closer judicial review on race-
conscious admissions programs. The Court held that UT must demonstrate 
“that available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not suffice” before it 
turns to considering the applicant’s race.213  Without saying much else, the 
Court remanded the case for review.   
The Court did not provide any new vision of diversity.  Instead it followed 
both Bakke and Grutter.  Restating Bakke, the Court distinguished diversity 
from forbidden racial balancing, 214  and held that the interest in the 
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body serves different 
values, “including enhanced classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial 
isolation and stereotypes.”215  The interest in diversity, the Court said, citing 
Bakke and Grutter, is not just an interest in simple ethnic diversity, but 
“encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of 
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.”216  
While not attributing any new values to diversity, the Court also did not refer 
to all of the interests previously recognized by the Court.  Most notably, 
Justice O’Connor’s egalitarian interpretation of diversity as an interest in 
ensuring that the “path to leadership” is “visibly open to talented and 
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity”217 was missing from the 
opinion. 218 
The diversity rationale was not challenged in this case, and therefore at 
no point was the Court required to provide an account of diversity. However, 
the partial way it described the benefits of diversity, confined to utilitarian 
educational benefits, indicates that the Court at the time of Fisher I, perhaps 
following the amicus briefs, was less receptive to an egalitarian understanding 
of diversity. 
	
Current and Former Fed. Civil Rights Officials in Support of Petitioner at 17, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 
2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978); 
then citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–31). 
 213 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420. 
 214 Id. at 2419. 
 215 Id. at 2418. 
 216 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315). 
 217 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332. 
 218 See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411. 
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V.  FISHER II: A RE-OPENED SPACE? 
After the Supreme Court remanded the case in Fisher I in July 2014, the 
Fifth Circuit, applying a stricter standard of scrutiny, affirmed UT’s race-
conscious admissions policy once again. 219  The petitioner, Abigail Fisher, 
claimed that the University had not articulated its compelling interest with 
sufficient clarity and that the consideration of race was not narrowly tailored 
because the University had in place a ‘top ten percent plan,’ a successful race-
neutral alternative.220 
A.  More of the Same Market-Driven Diversity in the Fisher II Briefs 
Once again, UT had to defend its consideration of race as part of a 
holistic policy.  In so doing, it articulated essentially the same utilitarian 
diversity interest in promoting “learning outcomes,” arguing that it “better 
prepare[s] students for an increasingly diverse work force, for civic 
responsibility in a diverse society, and for entry into professions, where they 
will need to deal with people of different races, cultures, languages, and 
backgrounds.”221  UT argued that the use of race as part of the holistic review 
is narrowly tailored, despite the relative success of the ‘top ten percent plan,’ 
and emphasized the individualized, rather than group, elements that 
constitute diversity—overcoming adversity, socioeconomic factors or special 
circumstances, such as race.222  With this focus, UT diverged from its brief 
in Fisher I and did not even cite Grutter’s interest “in ensuring that the path to 
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals.”223 
Social mobilization around UT’s admissions policy did not quiet down 
in Fisher II.  Sixty-eight amici curiae briefs were submitted in support of UT 
and fourteen in support of the petitioner.224 Many amici, however, filed the 
exact same briefs they had filed in Fisher I.  Others made only minor changes, 
and in any case, they did not articulate any new interpretation of diversity.  
	
219  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014). 
220  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 644, 654. 
 221 Brief for Respondents at 26, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
 222 See id. at 33–34 (“Just as overcoming adversity may distinguish an applicant, minority or otherwise, 
so too may showing an ability to cross racial lines and maneuver outside one’s ‘bubble’ . . . . Seeking 
diversity within diversity underscores that it is not ‘all about race’ . . . every student brings ‘a lot of 
other diversity pieces with them,’ like ‘geographic diversity . . . socioeconomic diversity . . . the type 
of school [a student] came from, . . . [the type of community he grew up in] rural, inner city, 
suburban . . . [his] background growing up . . . .’” (quoting Joint Appendix at 257a, 360a, 363a, 
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981))). 
 223 Brief for Respondents at 40, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. 
at 322). 
 224 For a complete list of amicus briefs submitted in both cases, see Office of the Vice President for 
Legal Affairs, U.S. Supreme Court (2011), UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN https://legal.utexas.edu/scotus-
2011 (last visited Feb. 4, 2017). 
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Thus, in the interest of brevity and in an effort to avoid an unnecessary 
repetition, this Article does not provide a detailed description of the amicus 
briefs filed in Fisher II.  In short, with a few exceptions of amicus briefs that 
emphasized both utilitarian benefits and the remedial or distributive 
potential of race-conscious affirmative action,225 the vast majority of amici 
supporting UT’s admissions policy followed the same utilitarian 
interpretation of diversity that was dominant in the Fisher I briefs.226  Even 
though some amicus briefs cited Grutter and did mention the interest in 
ensuring “that the path to leadership be visibly open” or other egalitarian 
claims, these briefs usually ascribed to other utilitarian pedagogical and 
mostly market-driven interests.227 
B.  Deference as Space for Meaning-Making in Fisher II 
On June 23, 2016, the Court announced its decision in Fisher II, 228 
allowing race-conscious affirmative action to continue. Justice Kennedy—
	
 225 See, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars & Constitutional Accountability Ctr. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents at 5, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (arguing that 
affirmative action aligns  with the original meaning of the 14th Amendment, which aims to ensure 
equality of opportunity to all persons regardless of race); Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Cedric 
Merlin Powell et al. in Support of Respondents at 2–4, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-
981) (arguing that “the notion that the Constitution is colorblind has no basis in the original intent 
of the Fourteenth Amendment or Brown”). 
 226 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae  Am. Council on Educ. et al. in Support of Respondents at 5, Fisher 
II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (“The nation’s colleges and universities seek student body 
diversity in pursuit of educational excellence. They must prepare students who will have to navigate 
a nation more diverse, and a world more interconnected, than ever before.”); Brief for Soc’y of Am. 
Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13–14, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) 
(No. 14-981) (“Studies have indicated that diversity in classroom conversations better prepares 
students to deal with global clients and colleagues”); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Univ. of N.C. at 
Chapel Hill in Support of Respondents at 2, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (“[A] 
diverse campus better prepares its students for participation in a diverse society and global 
economy.”); Brief of Cal. Inst. of Tech. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10, 
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (“In addition to promoting better learning outcomes, 
a diverse university community better prepares students for success in our increasingly diverse, 
increasingly global society.”). 
 227 See Brief for the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3–18, Fisher 
II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (arguing that in order “[t]o remain effective, the legal 
profession must reflect the changing demographics of the United States’ population.”); Brief of 
Brown Univ. et al. in Support of Respondents at 12–14, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-
981) (citing Grutter’s different rationales and explaining that institutions’ interest in diversity is 
derived from their educational mission to “develop active and engaged citizens equipped to handle 
the problems of a rapidly evolving world”); Brief of Leading Public Research Univs. et al. as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (“The 
university aims to further the causes of democracy and justice by opening pathways to leadership 
for members of traditionally underrepresented minority groups. Developing a vibrantly diverse 
campus not only creates opportunities for members to advocate for their own communities, but is 
also critical for multicultural understanding and collaboration in a deeply interconnected world.”). 
 228 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016). 
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who had been a long-time skeptic of race conscious affirmative action —
delivered the opinion of the Court and affirmed that “the educational benefits 
that flow from student body diversity” are a compelling state interest.229 
Fisher II boiled down to two major questions: (1) what kinds of diversity 
are compelling? (2) And how much diversity is enough diversity?230  Justice 
Kennedy provided hints and guidelines.  On the first question he held that 
diversity should not be assembled according to a single metric, such as class 
rank, that captures some elements of diversity and misses others.231  More 
generally, Kennedy added that diversity takes many forms and has many 
dimensions,232 and listed all the interests in diversity that UT identified in its 
brief.233  With respect to the second question, Kennedy  asserted that “[a] 
university’s goals cannot be elusory or amorphous—they must be sufficiently 
measurable to permit judicial scrutiny of the policies adopted to reach 
them.” 234   But Kennedy did not provide any binding answer to these 
questions. Instead, he took a step back and determined that only the 
universities themselves can answer those questions: 
Considerable deference is owed to a university in defining those intangible 
characteristics, like student body diversity, that are central to its identity and 
educational mission. But still, it remains an enduring challenge to our 
Nation’s education system to reconcile the pursuit of diversity with the 
constitutional promise of equal treatment and dignity.235 
As Richard T. Ford recognized, this was a big shift in the Court’s, and in 
Justice Kennedy’s, approach to affirmative action.236  Over the past decade, 
	
 229 Id. at 2210 (quoting Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013)). 
 230 Richard Thompson Ford narrows it down only to the second question of “how much diversity is 
enough?”  I read the case as also raising the question of what kinds of diversity should be valued. 
See Richard T. Ford, Did the Supreme Court Just Admit Affirmative Action is About Racial Justice?, VOX (July 
5, 2016, 12:02 PM), http://www.vox.com/2016/7/5/12085412/-supreme-court-affirmative-
action-decision-racial-justice-fisher-abigail-diversity.   
 231 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213–14 (“Class rank is a single metric, and like any single metric, it will 
capture certain types of people and miss others. . . .  Indeed, to compel universities to admit students 
based on class rank alone is in deep tension with the goal of educational diversity as this Court’s 
cases have defined it.”). 
 232 Id. at 2210 (“As the University examines this data, it should remain mindful that diversity takes 
many forms. Formalistic racial classifications may sometimes fail to capture diversity in all of its 
dimensions . . . .”) 
 233 Id. at 2211 (articulating Texas’s goals of “the destruction of stereotypes,” the “promot[ion of] cross-
racial understanding,” the “preparation of a student body” “for an increasingly diverse workforce 
and society,” the “cultivat[ion of] a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry,” and 
providing “an ‘academic environment’ that offers a ‘robust exchange of ideas, exposure to differing 
cultures, preparation for the challenges of an increasingly diverse workforce, and acquisition of 
competencies required of future leaders.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Supplemental Joint Appendix at 1a, 23a, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981)). 
 234 Id. at 2211. 
 235 Id. at 2214 (emphasis added). 
 236 Ford, supra note 230 (“[Fisher II] marks a turning point in the long controversy surrounding race-
conscious admissions policies and perhaps an important shift in the orientation of the Supreme 
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the Court had minimized its willingness to allow the use of race as an 
affirmative measure: in 2007, in a case called Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,237 the Court invalidated voluntary high 
school integration efforts that made use of racial criteria.  Add to that the 
ruling in Fisher I, which seemed to suggest that the majority of Justices had 
real doubts about the constitutionality of the use of race in admissions 
programs.238  And most recently in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action 
(2014),239 the Court affirmed a state ban on the use of race in affirmative 
action efforts in higher education and other realms.  In contrast to these 
cases, which posed direct and indirect constraints on affirmative action in 
higher education and on the vocabulary for public discourse about diversity, 
in Fisher II, the Court took a step back and invited universities to define their 
own interest in diversity. 
In its final section, the Article employs this historical account of diversity’s 
transformation in order to start exploring the stakes in framing diversity in 
one way or another, inviting universities and others to consider these 
tradeoffs in making claims about diversity. 
VI.  DIVERSITY – WHAT HAS GONE WRONG? 
A.  Why Has the Utilitarian Conception of Diversity Prevailed? Or, Did Diversity Go 
Wrong? 
The following sections of the Article suggest that the transformation of 
diversity as a legal justification—from an egalitarian understanding to a 
dominant utilitarian conception—impoverishes the public discourse on 
racial justice and risks the long-term struggle for racial equality.  Yet, before 
discussing the price of adopting the business case for diversity and 
abandoning the egalitarian one, it seems necessary to situate this 
transformation  in a historical context and ask why the utilitarian conception 
has prevailed.  This allows us to discuss the tradeoffs entailed in adopting 
such an approach and to then consider any normative implications it might 
	
Court as well.  Justice Kennedy, long the pivotal swing vote on the Court and a skeptic of affirmative 
action, voted to uphold UT’s policy.”).  
 237 551 U.S. 701, 707 (2007) (“Parents of students denied assignment to particular schools under these 
plans solely because of their race brought suit, contending that allocating children to different public 
schools on the basis of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection. 
The Court Appeals below upheld the plans. We granted certiorari, and now reverse.”) 
 238 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419–20 (2013) (requiring that reviewing courts independently explore 
whether the university could have obtained its objective of diversity with race-neutral alternatives). 
 239 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014) (“This case is not about how the debate about racial preferences 
should be resolved. It is about who may resolve it. . . . Deliberative debate on sensitive issues such 
as racial preferences all too often may shade into rancor. But that does not justify removing certain 
court-determined issues from the voters’ reach. Democracy does not presume that some subjects 
are either too divisive or too profound for public debate.”) 
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have. 
Trying to understand what has caused the transformation in the meaning 
of diversity between the Michigan cases and the Fisher litigation, it appears 
impossible to reach one conclusive answer.  Instead, in what follows, I 
explore three explanations that could have played a role in the take-over of 
utilitarian diversity: a political account of why certain characteristics of the 
utilitarian conception might have made it attractive grounds for broad 
political agreement; a narrow strategic explanation concerned with the 
changing makeup and ideology of the Court; and a brief overview of the 
much broader shift towards a neo-liberal paradigm.  These explanations are 
not mutually exclusive. 
1.  Utilitarian Diversity and Political Compromise 
Diversity, in its current formulation, is at the heart of a political 
consensus.  Opponents of affirmative action no longer challenge the 
compelling nature of diversity, and the debate now centers on how diversity 
ought to be achieved.  The utilitarian conception of diversity seems to have 
contributed, to say the least, to the formation and success of this political 
compromise.  Utilitarian diversity is consensual exactly because it does not 
entail moral commitments to remedial or distributive values, which not all 
segments of society share.240   Furthermore, utilitarian interests avoid much 
of the critique and controversy that was pointed at the remedial justification 
for affirmative action.  It builds upon forward-looking pedagogical needs for 
multiplicity of intellectual perspectives and on market-driven interests, rather 
than on redressing historical events that, over time, some argue, have lost 
their claim on how institutions of higher education ought to be structured.241  
Similarly, because utilitarian interests do not rely on notions of group 
disadvantages, but on the positive plurality of ideas and experiences of 
students from all segments of society, they avoid stereotyping, which is often 
associated with the remedial and distributive conceptions.  In other words, it 
offers a nonstigmatizing justification to give preference to members of 
targeted groups: they contribute valuable features to classroom discussion 
	
 240 See ROSENFELD, supra note 28, at 94 (“Thus, if one seeks to justify affirmative action in favor of a 
group as leading to the maximization of welfare, it becomes unnecessary to confront the arguments 
against such policy in the context of compensatory justice—namely, that because not all individual 
members of the group have experienced first-order discrimination, compensatory justice does not 
justify group-based preferential treatment.  Similarly, in the context of distributive justice, by 
focusing exclusively on welfare maximization, the utilitarian need not be concerned by the fact that 
preferential treatment in favor of a particular group tends to favor its most qualified members at 
the expense of its least qualified ones.”). 
 241 See ANDERSON, supra note 31, at 141 (“[The diversity model] is future-oriented, locating the point 
of affirmative action in continuing institutional needs for epistemic diversity rather than in receding 
events that, over time, lose their claim on how current institutions should be structured.”). 
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and by that advance the university’s mission.242  Another clear advantage of 
the utilitarian case for diversity  is that it associates racial preferences with 
improving the educational conditions for all students and the society at large, 
rather than helping a favored group.243  In doing so, utilitarian diversity 
portrays affirmative action as an educational policy that benefits everyone 
and therefore avoids the “innocent white” objection.244 
These rhetorical, symbolic, and actual advantages of the utilitarian 
conception of diversity make diversity an attractive ground for vast political 
consensus.  It aims to advance broadly shared interests that potentially 
benefit everyone, while dodging the major objections remedial and 
distributive values raise.  Proponents of affirmative action have surely taken 
these advantages into consideration in structuring their arguments before the 
Court.  Nonetheless, these advantages fail to fully explain why the embrace 
of utilitarian interests involved the retreat from egalitarian values, especially 
after the Grutter decision that articulated both utilitarian and egalitarian 
conceptions of diversity.  The two explanations below add some historical 
context that starts to provide an answer to this question. 
2.  Utilitarian Diversity and the Court 
At least in part, the turn to utilitarian diversity in the Fisher litigation was 
a strategic reaction to the shift in the composition of the Court:  while in the 
Michigan cases the swing vote on the bench was Justice O’Connor, at the 
time of Fisher, it was Justice Kennedy, who by then dissented in Grutter,245 and 
rejected the use of race in K-12 admissions policies. 246   Advocates of 
affirmative action must have taken this into consideration when framing their 
interest in diversity, strategically aiming to a less receptive Justice whose vote 
was likely to decide the case. 
	
 242 Id. 
 243 See Jeffries, supra note 67, at 7 (“Most important, diversity put the justification for racial preferences 
squarely on improving the educational experience of all students, rather than on helping a favored 
few.”). 
 244 For an account of the “innocent white” objection see David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative 
Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 805–
07 (1991); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 78, 96–97 (1986) (presenting the advantages of diversity as a forward-looking 
utilitarian value that remedies the  “sins of discrimination past”). 
 245 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court 
did not apply strict scrutiny, thereby undermining “both the test and its own controlling 
precedents”). 
 246 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2007) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In my view the state-mandated racial 
classifications at issue, officials labels proclaiming the race of all persons in a broad class of citizens—
elementary school students in one case, high school students in another—are unconstitutional as 
the cases now come to us.”). 
	
1196 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:5 
More broadly, in those years the Court had grown more conservative.  
Kenji Yoshino suggests that the Court suffered from a “pluralism anxiety”—
a fear arising from the influx of immigrants or newly visible groups of 
people—leading to growing limitations on equal protection jurisprudence as 
part of a larger shift from equality- to liberty-based rights.247  Nancy Leong 
argues that as a result of this shift towards conservatism and the reluctance of 
the Court to accept race-based preferences on remedial grounds, “advocates 
of race-conscious policies in both employment and education increasingly 
relied on the interest in diversity as their most promising legal strategy.”248  
Adding to this account, I suggest that these growing conservative trends lead 
proponents of affirmative action to eventually adopt the utilitarian conception 
of diversity and abandon its egalitarian interpretations.   
3.  Utilitarian Diversity, Neoliberalism and Corporate Diversity 
The utilitarian shift that this Article describes might also reflect a much 
larger shift to a market-driven paradigm.  Scholars have investigated the 
takeover of neoliberal and market-driven ideologies in a variety of 
domains,249 and commentators have described the rise of such ideologies and 
their manifestation in colleges and universities.  They explained how 
institutions of higher education have been increasingly operating according 
to business principles and motivations,250 and denounce the prosperity of 
career-oriented education at the expense of the humanities.251  Dave Hill and 
Ravi Kumar explain that “[t]he restructuring of the schooling and education 
systems across the world is part of the ideological and policy offensive by 
neoliberal capital.”252   In the shadow of an overall turn to a neoliberal 
paradigm, it is easier to understand the growing dominancy of market-driven 
	
 247 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 747–48, 751–54 (2011). 
 248 Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2163 (2013). 
 249 For an extensive survey, see generally David Harvey, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2015) 
(describing the neoliberal turn in the United States from the 1970s to the 2000s). 
 250 See generally LAWRENCE BUSCH, KNOWLEDGE FOR SALE: THE NEOLIBERAL TAKEOVER OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION (2017) (explaining how the focus of higher education shifted to competition, 
metrics, consumer demand, and return on investment).  
 251 See e.g., HENRY GIROUX, NEOLIBERALISM’S WAR ON HIGHER EDUCATION (2014) (describing 
how market-driven ideology and practice have radically reshaped the nature of higher education, 
and calling for an intervention to save universities as democratic sites of critical learning); Heidi 
Tworek, The Real Reason the Humanities are ‘in Crisis,’ ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/12/the-real-reason-the-humanities-are-
in-crisis/282441/ (arguing that most of the decline in enrollment in the humanities happened in 
1970 to 1985 due to women enrolling in career-oriented majors, but that those majors did not 
substantially affect the employment outcomes of women graduates, indicating that the gender wage 
gap was not due to and cannot be fixed by a difference in the practicality of career choice). 
 252  Dave Hill & Ravi Kumar, Introduction: Neoliberal Capitalism and Education, in GLOBAL NEOLIBERALISM 
AND EDUCATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1, 1 (Dave Hill & Ravi Kumar eds., 2009). 
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arguments in the realm of higher education.  In such times, when higher 
education is being privatized and commodified, it is not surprising that the 
rhetoric we find in educational missions of universities or in the briefs 
referring to the goals of higher education, increasingly builds on market-logic 
and is deeply invested in economic and other measurable interests. 
Relatedly, scholars describe how in the 1980s and, especially, the 1990s, 
the business case for diversity in the workplace flourished and gradually took 
the place of more traditional affirmative action.253  This shift in the corporate 
arena emerged before, and infiltrated the educational realm and influenced 
it.  As Ben Gose explains, “universities are following the lead of the corporate 
world, where chief diversity officers have been in vogue since the 1990s.”254  
The spillover of the business case for diversity from the corporate arena to 
higher education, along the broader neoliberal trends taking over higher 
education provide some historical context to the shift in the meaning of 
diversity and help understand why recently the utilitarian conception has 
come to dominate. 
Neither one of these explanations provides a conclusive answer to the 
question of why the utilitarian conception of diversity has prevailed or why the 
shift was so extreme and broad.  Still, together these explanations contribute 
to our understanding as they situate this process in a political and historical 
context.  These explanations also suggest that adopting a utilitarian approach 
to diversity had clear political, strategic, and actual benefits.  Thus, it seems 
safe to assume that the described shift contributed to the survival of affirmative 
action on campus and in courts.  Taking those clear benefits into account, this 
Article proceeds to discuss the possible costs of adopting such a total utilitarian 
conception of diversity.  This Article has no interest in finding anyone at 
historical fault.  Instead, in what follows, it explores the tradeoffs encompassed 
in this shift.  In its final part, the Article builds on this investigation to suggest 
that a more balanced approach to diversity should be restored. 
B.  Diversity Resignfied:  from an Egalitarian Ideal to a Diluted Utilitarian Interest 
The Article opened with this inquiry: when do diversity claims promote 
equality and when do they inhibit it? 
	
 253 See, e.g., Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management:  Employer 
Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 960, 961, 971 (1998) (providing 
a historical account of affirmative action in the workplace and describing how equal opportunity 
measures were recast as diversity initiatives); David B. Oppenheimer, The Disappearance of Voluntary 
Affirmative Action from the US Workplace, 24 J. POVERTY & SOC. JUST. 37, 44–46 (2016) (describing 
the transformation from affirmative action to diversity management in the workplace and 
highlighting its potential cost on racial minorities and women). 
 254 Ben Gose, The Rise of the Chief Diversity Officer, CHRON. HIGH. EDUC. (Sept. 29, 2006), 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Rise-of-the-Chief/7327. 
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Many scholars have recognized the value of diversity as a rationale for 
affirmative action.  Some, like many of the amici, tried to explain how 
diversity in itself can be a positive good to our workforce, educational 
mission, or democracy.255  Duncan Kennedy even argues for an expansion 
of our current commitment to cultural diversity, aiming to comply with the 
democratic principle of representation.256  Others have valued diversity for 
its consensual status257 and argued that despite its disadvantages, diversity 
serves as a useful political compromise that allows universities to continue 
practicing affirmative action. 258   Kathleen M. Sullivan, former dean of 
Stanford Law School, urged courts to stop seeing affirmative action as a 
penalty of the past and invited them to embrace diversity as a prospective 
rationale that serves present and future benefits of institutions.  “[B]y turning 
to such forward-looking justification,” she explained, “the Court might more 
effectively quiet protests about windfalls to nonvictims and injustice to 
innocents than it has by treating affirmative action as penance for past 
sins.” 259   Reva Siegel suggested that those Justices who embraced the 
diversity rationale were motivated by concerns about social cohesion, trying 
to avoid the threats that a more direct rationale for affirmative action might 
pose.260  While one does not have to embrace all these values, it is impossible 
to ignore the strength of the diversity rationale and the major role it has 
played in the survival of affirmative action. 
Critics, on the other hand, warned that diversity, as opposed to the 
abandoned remedial rationale, is far from a viable means of ensuring 
affirmative action.261  Derrick Bell argued that diversity is actually “a serious 
distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial justice.”262  Richard T. 
Ford added that “a central function of ‘diversity’ is to finesse, if not obscure 
	
 255 See, e.g., RICHARD D. BUCHER & PATRICIA L. BUCHER, DIVERSITY CONSCIOUSNESS: OPENING 
OUR MINDS TO PEOPLE, CULTURES, AND OPPORTUNITIES (2004) (describing how diverse schools 
and workplaces allow us to communicate and collaborate more successfully); LEVINSON, supra note 
5, at 1–54.  For an account of Grutter and the potential benefits of diversity for democracy, see Post, 
supra note 63, at 60–64. 
 256 Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L. J. 705, 
712–721 (1990). 
 257 See SCHUCK, supra note 10, at 12 (“In the pantheon of unquestioned goods, diversity is right up 
there with progress, motherhood, and apple pie.”); Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 573, 578 (2000) (“[I]t is becoming ever more difficult to find anyone who is willing to say, in 
public, that institutional or social homogeneity is a positive good and diversity a substantive harm.”). 
 258 See Deborah C. Malamud, Values, Symbols, and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
1668, 1707–08 (1997) (suggesting that diversity, a rationale for affirmative action, has become “a 
popular alternative to the remediation of socioeconomic disadvantage”). 
 259 Sullivan, supra note 244, at 97. 
 260 Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality 
Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1294 (2011). 
 261 See supra notes 73–76. 
 262 Bell, supra note 8, at 1622. 
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the salience of contemporary racism,” 263  as it “enables courts and 
policymakers to avoid addressing directly the barriers of race and class.”264  
Kenneth Nunn added that diversity “allows people of color to be used for the 
purposes of the educational institution and ultimately for the benefit of white 
students and their educational needs.”265  Others tie diversity to the concept 
of identity politics and argue that it would “fumble American society’s 
extraordinary opportunities to build an economy and a civic culture.”266 
So, does diversity promote equality or inhibit it?  Drawing on the 
historical account of diversity’s transformation, I argue that neither side has 
a full understanding of what is at stake in making diversity claims and that 
the answer is more complex.  Parts III and IV of this Article show how 
understandings about diversity shifted from notions about rectifying past 
injustice and distribution towards utilitarian interests and market benefits.  
But should this account matter when evaluating the relationship between 
diversity and equality?  I argue that it does, in two significant ways.  First, 
neither the praises of diversity nor its critiques are fully accurate as long as 
they hold the interest in diversity to have a fixed value.  In other words, the 
social function of diversity changes with its constitutional meaning, through 
debates and over time.  This means that the diversity compromise today 
might have different costs and benefits than it did at the time of Bakke.  
Second, in evaluating the stakes of making diversity claims today, I argue 
that one needs to understand not only the current popular understanding of 
it, but also the transformation that charged it with values over time. 
	
 263 RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 52 (2005); see also Richard T. Ford, Beyond 
“Difference”: A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 46–47 
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (arguing that Bakke changed the racial landscape on 
American college campuses and that “[t]he Powell opinion silently institutionalized an ethnicity 
model of race that emphasizes cultural difference over status hierarchy. In the ethnicity paradigm, 
the position of blacks is analogous to that of, say, Italian Americans: both have distinctive cultural 
backgrounds and therefore may contribute a unique perspective to the university environment.”); 
Malamud, supra note 258, at 1708–09 (arguing that educational institutions’ efforts to promote 
diversity through affirmative action programs “generates a nonuniform set of institutional 
expectations for the diverse and nondiverse candidates who are selected. The White candidates are 
there to do their jobs . . . . The diverse candidates must do their jobs, be role models, and teach the 
rest of the workforce how the world looks from their diverse perspectives. They can never be at 
peace in the same way as those whose right to be on the job is socially constructed as based on their 
pure individual merit.”).  
 264 See Bell, supra note 8, at 1622; see also WALTER BENN MICHAELS, THE TROUBLE WITH DIVERSITY: 
HOW WE LEARNED TO LOVE IDENTITY AND IGNORE INEQUALITY 19–20 (2006) (arguing that the 
American obsession with racial diversity masks the “real problem” of socioeconomic inequality). 
 265 Kenneth B. Nunn, Diversity as a Dead-End, 35 PEPP. L. REV 705, 723 (2008). 
 266 See Jim Sleeper, What NY Times Op-Ed Writer Mark Lilla Gets Wrong About ‘Identity Liberalism,’ 
ALTERNET, (Nov. 21, 2016, 8:44 AM), https://www.alternet.org/election-2016/what-ny-times-
op-ed-writer-mark-lilla-gets-wrong-about-identity-liberalism.  For a more comprehensive 
discussion, see JIM SLEEPER, LIBERAL RACISM: HOW FIXATING ON RACE SUBVERTS THE 
AMERICAN DREAM (1997). 
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Let me clarify the second point.  In her book from 2012, Fortunes of 
Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis, Nancy Fraser 
explains how the second-wave feminist critique of gender injustice, which 
was meant to expose the structural limitations on women’s equality, was 
narrowed down to “identity politics.”267  This allowed neo-liberal capitalism 
to rely on feminist ideals for legitimation, without changing the practices or 
structures that are responsible for women’s continuous economic 
subordination.268  In doing so, she develops the concept of resignification by 
which prior strands of critique or reformative ideals are taken up in a diluted 
and narrow way that can help the system gain legitimacy without disrupting 
its overall practices and structure.269  These ideals, she explains, are being 
resignified and thereby enriched with a higher moral significance that 
legitimates the status quo.270 
Diversity, I argue, was resignified—neither by opponents of affirmative 
action, nor by its proponents, but in the interaction between the two that 
took place around the Fisher litigation.  Diversity, as the Article shows, was 
not adopted as an egalitarian rationale, but rather as a political compromise 
that emphasized its educational benefits but left its definition at least 
somewhat open-ended.271  Social movements, university officials, and finally 
the Grutter’s Court infused diversity with prospective and retrospective 
egalitarian aspirations that reiterated diversity as a standard of critique for 
racial disparities and as an ideal for social reform.  For a long time, diversity 
embodied a connection to the history of state-enforced hierarchies as well as 
a commitment to egalitarian social change.272  Yet, these convictions shifted.  
When social mobilization around the Fisher litigation spiked, diversity 
became a market-based interest celebrating different cultures and 
backgrounds.  However, it was decoupled both from the history of race 
discrimination and from aspirations to dismantle its persistence.273  Diversity 
became an ever more popular goal of social reform and a desirable moral 
standard for racial justice—aspired to by universities,274 and advocated for 
	
 267 See Fraser, supra note 19, at 219. 
 268  Id. at 219–20. 
 269 Id. at 217–23.  In developing the concept, Fraser builds on LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE CHIAPELLO, 
THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 3–4 (Gregory Elliott trans., 2005), which explains how capitalism 
remakes itself, in part by co-opting strands of critique directed against it. 
 270  See Fraser, supra note 19, at 220–21. 
 271 See supra Part II. 
 272 See supra Part III. 
 273 See supra Part IV.A. 
 274 See, e.g., Mission Statement, COLUM. UNIV., http://home.columbia.edu/content/mission-statement 
(last visited April 30, 2018) (“It seeks to attract a diverse and international faculty and student body, 
to support research and teaching on global issues, and to create academic relationships with many 
countries and regions.”); Mission Statement, UCLA, http://www.studentaffairs.ucla.edu/Mission-
Statement (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (“In all of our pursuits, we strive at once for excellence and 
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by every sector in society.275  Yet at the same time, diversity was divested 
from its remedial and distributive goals, aspiring instead to train students for 
the global workforce and foster the economy. This process, in which the ideal 
became consensual and simultaneously diluted from its reformist 
redistributive goals, works to legitimate the hierarchal status quo and 
immunizes those who embrace it—institutions and citizens—from critique, 
and thus risk stalling a more structural racial reform. 
Amicus briefs are in large part, strategic, and surely they do not represent 
the only conversation about race that is taking place in universities, where 
many are committed to ideals of racial equality.276  Thus, I do not resist the 
notion that doubletalk regarding diversity efforts exists. However, the amicus 
briefs, despite their highly strategic nature provide a crack, if not a window 
through which to witness the dynamics of popular constitutionalism and the 
evolving meaning of diversity.277  Furthermore, even if amicus briefs are a 
strategic, it seems that overtime the face has been growing to fit the mask.  Diversity, 
and in recent years utilitarian diversity, is arguably the predominant form of 
public discourse about race.  Indeed, university mission statements as well as 
diversity reports have drifted from egalitarian and remedial commitments to 
a utilitarian celebration of diversity in tandem with the amicus briefs.278  And 
	
diversity, recognizing that openness and inclusion produce true quality.”); Diversity & Inclusion, 
AMHERST C,, https://www.amherst.edu/amherst-story/diversity (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (“We 
believe that a great intellectual community should look like the world.”). 
 275 This became evident from the diversity of amici who supported UT in the Fisher litigation, including 
States, local governments, the federal government, veterans, civil society organizations, business, 
students, and universities.  For a detailed account, see supra Part IV.A.1. 
 276 See LEVINSON, supra note 5, at 46 (quoting a letter from Jack Balkin) (“I understand ‘diversity’ to be 
a code word for representation in enjoyment of social goods by major ethnic groups who have some 
claim to past mistreatment.”). 
 277 The history of diversity itself reveals that amici did not always make strategic arguments.  While 
the Bakke Court focused on the instrumental benefits of diversity to the educational process, the 
Grutter amici diverged from the Court’s interpretation and insisted on an egalitarian understanding 
of diversity.  See supra Part III.A.1.  Furthermore, scholars of popular constitutionalism traditionally 
turn to amicus briefs to learn about popular and professional understandings of the Constitution.  
See, e.g., Brown-Nagin, supra note 81, at 1439 (“The affirmative action cases are excellent texts to 
consider from a social movement perspective because they featured a group of intervenors in Grutter 
who styled themselves a ‘mass movement’ for social justice.”); Siegel, supra note 82, at 1395 n.220 
(analyzing amicus briefs to learn about the interaction between feminist movement and the courts 
in the question of abortion). 
 278 For examples of contemporary interpretations of diversity in university documents, see “Diversity 
& Inclusion” section of It’s Your Yale, YALE, http://your.yale.edu/community/diversity-inclusion 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (“A diverse workforce and inclusive environment increases productivity, 
creates new ideas, performs on a higher level, and enhances Yale’s ability to continue to excel in an 
increasingly complex, competitive and diverse world.”); Letter and Memo from Christina H. 
Paxon, President, Brown Univ., to Members of the Brown Cmty. (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://brown.edu/web/documents/diversity/actionplan/diap-full.pdf (explaining that diversity is 
essential to prepare “students to thrive and lead in the complex and changing settings they’ll 
encounter after they graduate”); see also supra notes 221–26 (detailing the interpretation of diversity 
	
1202 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:5 
thus, the Article argues that the way we talk and think about diversity in courts 
and on campus affects the way we think about racial justice generally. In other 
words, the vocabulary for public discourse about racial justice shapes the 
conversation, frames commitments, and can affect the way we act.  The 
resignified diversity framework, I suggest, does this in two significant ways. 
First, the public vocabulary regarding race is gradually confined to terms 
of culture and identity, rather than a category of power hierarchies. Race, 
under the utilitarian discursive regime, became mostly a marker for students’ 
culture, or background, which can contribute, like a type of commodity, to the 
“robust exchange of ideas” and the training of students.  Nancy Leong calls 
this phenomenon “racial capitalism,” by which she means “commodification 
of racial identity, thereby degrading that identity by reducing it to another 
thing to be bought and sold.”279 This process can be further understood 
according to Neil Gotanda’s typology of race.280   Gotanda distinguished 
between status-race, formal-race, historical-race, and culture-race. Status-
race means “the traditional notion of race as an indicator of social status.”281  
The opposite notion is formal-race, which has no connection to any other 
attribute except skin color.  Historical race does not apply any essential 
meaning to race, but it “embodies past and continuing racial 
subordination.”282  And culture-race refers to the culture and community of 
the racial group.283  The utilitarian diversity framework, I suggest, works to 
limit understandings of race to “culture-race,” and it attributes value to the 
other types of race only to the extent that they inform this cultural 
conception, which is instrumental to fostering the marked-based celebration 
of diversity.284 
	
put forward by the University of Texas in its Fisher II briefing, and how this differed from even the 
Fisher I and Grutter conceptions.) 
In contrast, many of the materials dated to the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s saw the interest 
in diversity as part of their commitment to social justice and equality.  See, e.g., RECRUITMENT AND 
RETENTION OF MINORITY GROUP MEMBERS ON THE FACULTY AT YALE 1 (1989) (“The full and 
successful participation of all segments of the nation’s population in all aspects of our society’s life 
is urgently needed. The urgency has special force for the nation’s schools and universities as they 
provide the foundation for such participation. . . .  The fullest development of our human resources 
as well as equity and social justice demand that we at Yale address this issue.”); VISITING 
COMMITTEE ON DIVERSITY, DIVERSITY, PLURALISM, AND COMMUNITY AT BROWN  13 (2000) 
(“[t]he commitment to diversity involves not only accepting and recognizing difference, but also 
challenging the inequities in power . . . .” (quoting Johnnella E. Butler)). 
 279 See Leong, supra note 248, at 2152. 
 280 Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991). 
 281  Id. at 4. 
 282  Id. 
 283 Id. at 4–5. 
 284 In some ways, this process is parallel to the color-blind turn in antidiscrimination law, which was 
divested from antisubordination and group-based understandings of race to individual ones.  
Resisting this shift, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 
157 (1976) (“It is from this perspective—one of a proscription against status- harm—that 
	
May 2018] DIVERSITY GONE WRONG 1203 
Second, under the utilitarian paradigm, diversity and its egalitarian 
meaning are not goods in themselves, but instruments serving greater goods 
of professional success and economic prosperity.  The instrumentalization of 
diversity, and its egalitarian interpretation, diminishes the value of diversity 
as well as equality and lessens the institutional and public committed to it. 
More specifically,  this prospective functionalist approach to diversity blurs 
connections to the history of discrimination and sheds any commitment to 
amending its effects.  Past as well as present racial disparities become 
irrelevant to the mission of higher education.  Arguing for the compelling 
interest in diversity, universities often referred to their educational mission.  
While at the time of the Michigan cases this mission included both 
egalitarian, democratic, and utilitarian aspirations,285 at the time of Fisher I it 
was mostly confined to the training of students and equipping “professionals 
and business leaders to interact with diverse customers, clients, co-workers, 
and business partners.”286  Under this vision, the role of higher education is 
deprived of previous commitments to foster equality or remedy past 
injustices, and instead, universities are conceptualized as training and 
networking career centers in which students are both the commodity from 
which diversity is ‘made’ as well as its beneficiaries or clients. 
Race still shapes educational opportunity.  However, the utilitarian 
paradigm, I suggest, limits the public vocabulary and imagination from 
recognizing this.  It fails to identify past and present forms of racial inequality 
and their relevance to the mission of higher education, and therefore, 
absolves universities from taking a role in fighting systematic inequality and 
at the same time immunizes them from being held accountable for it.  In 
disregarding this systemic inequality, the utilitarian paradigm might gain 
popular support for adopting ‘diversity measures,’ but it simultaneously risks 
impeding the long-term struggle for racial justice, making us blind and numb 
to the ongoing racial stratification.  While these costs might sound abstract 
or focused on far future concerns, in what follows I suggest that we might 
already be witnessing some of this impact in the realm of student activism. 
C.  Renaming Buildings and Institutions, Safe Spaces, and Trigger Warnings 
In recent years, students all over the United States have been mobilizing 
around demands for renaming buildings or other structures on campus, 
	
discriminatory state action should be viewed.”). 
 285 See supra Part III.A.I (exploring how many amici in Grutter viewed diversity); see also supra note 269 
(explaining how the shift to a more utilitarian view of diversity evolved through a comparison to 
the evolution of capitalist ideology).  
 286 Brief of Amici Curiae American Council on Educ. et al. in Support of Respondents at 6, Fisher II, 
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981).  
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trigger warnings, and safe spaces.  The Article does not presume to provide 
a comprehensive account of this movement, nor does it take a stand in this 
nuanced debate for or against any of these demands.287  Instead, it proposes 
that the recent rise in such demands sparks important questions about the 
implications of the ahistorical and market-driven paradigm that has 
controlled the conversation of race on campus over the last decade, and can 
help us better understand its cost. 
Controversies over university building names and symbols began at the 
University of Texas in 2010, where a building named after a Ku Klux Klan 
member was renamed.288   Since then, and mostly since 2014, following 
students’ protests, buildings associated with white supremacists and slave 
owners at institutions such as Duke, Georgetown, and University of Oregon 
were renamed.  In 2015, Princeton students challenged the name of the 
university’s Woodrow Wilson School on the basis of Wilson’s views on race, 
but the demand was denied.289  Stanford initiated a study relating to the use 
of the name of Junípero Serra, a Catholic missionary who colonized 
California for Spain in the 18th century and whose history among Native 
Americans is controversial.290   Harvard Law School decided to alter the 
symbol on its shield that was designed after a crest of a slaveholder,291 and at 
Yale, after a two year deliberation, it was decided to rename Calhoun College, 
named after John C. Calhoun, the American vice president who defended 
slavery. 292   The issue of renaming has gathered a great deal of public 
	
 287 For popular commentary on this debate, see for example, RaeAnn Pickett, Trigger Warnings and Safe 
Spaces Are Necessary, TIME (Aug. 31, 2016), http://time.com/4471806/trigger-warnings-safe-spaces/ 
(arguing that safe spaces and trigger warnings provide an environment where students are able to feel 
secure enough to learn); Rajshree Agarwal, Afraid to Speak Up: In the Era of Trigger Warnings, a Tenured 
Professor Stays Silent, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-
point/wp/2016/10/04/afraid-to-speak-up-in-the-era-of-trigger-warnings-a-tenured-professor-stays-
silent/?utm_term=.14d45ec75d63 (discussing how safe spaces and trigger warning might create “a 
culture of fear” silencing opposing viewpoints in higher education).  For a survey of the renaming 
controversy, see Sewell Chan, Historical Figures, Campus Controversies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/29/education/college-symbol-controversies.html. 
 288 Board Votes to Change Name of UT Dorm Named for Klan Member, CNN (July 15, 2010), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/07/15/texas.klan.dorm/index.html; CTR. FOR ECONS. & POLICY 
RESEARCH, LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE TO ESTABLISH PRINCIPLES ON RENAMING 8 (2016). 
 289 Ellen Brait, Princeton Students Demand Removal of Woodrow Wilson’s Name from Buildings, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 23, 2015, 8:35 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/nov/23/princeton-
woodrow-wilson-racism-students-remove-name. 
 290 Scott Jaschik, Stanford to Set Principles for Renaming Buildings, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2016/03/07/stanford-set-principles-renaming-
buildings. 
 291 Harvard Corporation Agrees to Retire HLS Shield, HARV. L. TODAY (Mar. 14, 2016), 
http://today.law.harvard.edu/harvard-corporation-agrees-to-retire-hls-shield/. 
 292 Shortly after Yale’s report establishing the Principles on Renaming was issued in 2016, another 
committee was appointed to make a recommendation with respect to renaming Calhoun College. 
See Peter Salovey, Update on Calhoun Advisory Process (Jan. 9, 2017), https://messages.yale.edu/ 
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attention, and has been debated by scholars and in the popular media.293 
During roughly the same period of time, universities across the country 
have been wrestling with student requests for what are known as trigger 
warnings.  Trigger warnings are explicit alerts for students that the material 
they are about to encounter in a classroom can potentially be distressing.294  
Some asserted that these warnings should be confined to materials that can 
potentially cause symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder in victims of 
rape or in war veterans, while others advocated for trigger warning in other 
potentially upsetting settings. 295   Similarly, safe spaces are places where 
students can avoid distressing subjects and confrontations.296  The demand 
for safe spaces originally came from women and LGBTQ groups trying to 
create spaces free of harassment for all lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender students.297  The term has been expanded to refer to a space for 
other individuals who feel marginalized. 298   These requests are often 
accompanied by discussions about racial insensitivities, cultural 
appropriation, and microaggressions towards students of color.  Public 
discourse and further mobilization around these issues came to a head in 
August 2016 after the University of Chicago’s dean of students sent a 
welcome letter to freshmen students, stating that the school does “not support 
so-called ‘trigger warnings,’ [it does] not cancel invited speakers because 
their topics might prove controversial, and [it does] not condone the creation 
	
messages/University/univmsgs/detail/147063. And in February 2017 it was finally decided to 
change the name of Calhoun College and rename it after Grace Murray Hopper. See Peter 
Salovey, Official University Messages, YALE UNIVERSITY (Feb. 10, 2017, 4:24 PM), 
https://messages.yale.edu/messages/University/univmsgs/detail/149000 (last updated Feb. 11, 
2017, 2:01 PM). 
 293 For an overview of the recent controversies over renaming, see CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, 
supra note 288.  See also Valerie Strauss, Why Names Matter: The Fight at Clemson Over Iconic University Building 
Named After Racist Governor, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
answer-sheet/wp/2015/02/26/why-names-matter-the-fight-at-clemson-over-iconic-university-
building-named-after-racist-governor/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d16d8e7ef9a0 (reporting on the 
debate between students and the board of trustees over changing the name of a Clemson University 
campus building).  For a review of the controversies in the international context, see Sewell Chan, 
Historical Figures, Campus Controversies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2016/01/29/education/college-symbol-controversies.html (summarizing the success of 
student activism on college campuses in changing names, statues, and other symbols of historical figures). 
 294 For the origins of trigger warnings in feminist and disability thought, see Angela M. Carter, Teaching 
with Trauma: Trigger Warnings, Feminism, and Disability Pedagogy, 35 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 1, 5 (2015). 
 295 For a survey of the 2013 debate over trigger warnings, see Amanda Marcotte, The Year of the Trigger 
Warning, SLATE (Dec. 30, 2013, 10:42 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/ 
12/30/trigger_warnings_from_the_feminist_blogosphere_to_shonda_rhimes_in_2013.html. 
 296 Pickett, supra note 287. 
 297 MOIRA RACHEL KENNEDY, MAPPING GAY L.A.: THE INTERSECTION OF PLACE AND POLITICS 
24 (2001). 
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of intellectual ‘safe spaces’ where individuals can retreat from ideas and 
perspectives at odds with their own.”299 
Of course, each of these demands must be contextualized, discussed and 
decided on its own merits.  I do not take a stand in this debate, but instead 
propose that the costs of adopting a utilitarian approach to questions of racial 
justice are evident in these demands in two, somewhat contradictory ways.  
First, the movement can be understood as a backlash to the utilitarian 
paradigm that has been controlling the conversation on race in the past 
decade in courts (briefs and opinions) and on campuses—contesting its 
indirect and ahistorical nature, and aspiring to get intuitions to recognize 
past injustices as well as to commit, once again, to rectifying them.  Second, 
the demands students are making appear to be limited by similar conceptions 
of race—confined to symbolic notions of identity and culture—and thus risk 
reproducing them. 
The current wave of student activism seems to be contesting the 
dominant approach to questions of race on campus.  Students are resisting 
their institutions, which they feel fundamentally misunderstand their 
experience of race as a category of power that is very present in their lives.  
As a Yale senior Aaron Lewis explained, the 2015 protest at Yale was really 
“about a mismatch between the Yale we find in admissions brochures and 
the Yale we experience every day. They’re about real experiences with 
racism on this campus that have gone unacknowledged for far too long.”300  
Similarly, students resist the ongoing erasure of the history of racial 
oppression in higher education, and aspire to get their universities to 
acknowledge, in some way, the wrongs of the past.301  As The Stanford Daily 
reported, “[s]upporters of the resolution argue that removing Serra’s name 
from buildings is a step toward correcting the erasure of history.” 302  
Similarly, in support of retiring the controversial slaveholder’s symbol from 
the school’s shield, Harvard students said it was “a symbol of exclusion—a 
reminder of an exclusionary past that should have no place in an inclusive 
present,” and that it leads students of color “to question whether they are 
accepted as equal members of the Law School community, particularly in 
	
 299 Letter from John Ellison, Dean of Students, The College of Univ. of Chi., to the Incoming Student 
Class of 2020 (Aug. 26, 2016). 
 300 Aaron Z. Lewis, What’s Really Going on at Yale, MEDIUM, Nov. 8, 2015, 
https://medium.com/@aaronzlewis/what-s-really-going-on-at-yale-6bdbbeeb57a6#.t0q31knkt. 
 301 See, e.g., CTR. FOR ECONS. & POLICY RESEARCH, supra note 288, at 7 (“Many students focused 
attention on the relationship between a namesake’s beliefs and the University’s professed values of 
community and inclusiveness. . . .  Some students said that the Calhoun name was emblematic of 
a more general phenomenon of racial oppression and injustice at Yale.”). 
 302 Sarah Wishingrad, Resolution to Rename Buildings Named After Father Junipero Serra Gains Support, Faces 
Backlash, STAN. DAILY (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.stanforddaily.com/resolution-to-rename-
buildings-named-after-father-junipero-serra-gains-support-faces-backlash/. 
	
May 2018] DIVERSITY GONE WRONG 1207 
the face of what they experience as other slights.”303  Black Justice League 
members at Princeton noted that “they had often felt excluded and 
continually if subtly called on to justify their presence at one of the nation’s 
top schools. . . . [a]nd for some students, Wilson’s name and image around 
campus feel like constant reminders that they are not entirely welcome.”304  
An ahistorical understanding of race, it seems, does not reflect the students’ 
lived experiences, and utilitarian motivations are no longer adequate to 
reflect their aspirations for racial justice.  Thus, by uncovering what has been 
neglected, recent activism highlights the costs of embracing an all-utilitarian 
approach to questions of race: institutions that aspire for greater student 
diversity, but are somewhat detached from both the history and the current 
reality of race in America.    
However, the demands that resulted in this backlash, I suggest, are 
confined by the very same utilitarian regime and its attendant convictions 
about race.  And thus, the costs of the utilitarian approach become evident 
not only in what universities have been missing, but also in the demands that 
define this movement.  The recent demands are centered on symbolic 
notions of race as identity, asking mainly for cultural recognition rather than 
for redistribution.305  In this respect, the movement’s imagination seems to 
be limited by the dominant conceptualization of race as a marker of identity 
and culture rather than as a category of power hierarchies.  The focus on 
symbolic demands for cultural recognition I suggest, risks contributing to the 
ongoing diversion of institutional attention from the status quo of racial 
stratification on and off campus.  Furthermore, the demands are often 
framed in a manner that does not challenge systematic racism or inequality, 
but as requests for removal of or protection from obstacles to learning and 
training.306  “You have to do something to . . .  make sure that everybody can 
be educated,” as one student activist said while articulating her support of 
trigger warnings.307  The relatively narrow scope of student demands, their 
inward-facing direction, and their utilitarian framing seem to be constrained 
by the notion of universities as professional training centers, and reflecting 
their inability to conceptualize higher education as a site of social change. 
	
 303 BRUCE H. MANN ET AL., RECOMMENDATION TO THE PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD 
COLLEGE ON THE SHIELD APPROVED FOR THE LAW SCHOOL 8 (Mar. 3, 
2016), https://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2016/03/Shield-Committee-Report.pdf. 
 304 Andy Newman, At Princeton, Woodrow Wilson, a Heralded Alum, Is Recast as an Intolerant One, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/nyregion/at-princeton-addressing-a-
racist-legacy-and-seeking-to-remove-woodrow-wilsons-name.html?_r=0. 
 305 Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age, 212 NEW 
LEFT REV. 68, 70–72 (1995) (distinguishing claims for cultural and group recognition from claims 
for redistribution while discussing the possible tradeoff between the two). 
 306 See e.g., Kate Manne, Why I Use Trigger Warnings, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/opinion/sunday/why-i-use-trigger-warnings.html?_r=0 
(“Under conditions such as these, it’s impossible to think straight.”). 
 307 Amenabar, supra note 298 (quoting Sasha Gilthorpe). 
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Similarly, while the appeal for renaming is clearly haunted by historical 
racial oppression, and demands to stop ignoring it, it risks taking part in the 
ongoing erasure of the past.  In many instances the demands for renaming 
resulted in an establishment of a committee and sparked a time-limited 
conversation about the specific request.  Thus, the demands have been 
successful in provoking discussions about the history of racism in the short 
term, but might compromise the ability of universities to engage in such 
conversations and struggles in the long term as they eliminate the very relics 
that sparked these conversations in the first place. 
In an op-ed from November 2016, Mark Lilla voiced a harsh critique of 
diversity-discourse and of recent students’ demands, characterizing both as 
forms of identity politics: 
[T]he fixation on diversity in our schools and in the press has produced a 
generation of liberals and progressives narcissistically unaware of conditions 
outside their self-defined groups, and indifferent to the task of reaching out to 
Americans in every walk of life. . . .  By the time they reach college many 
assume that diversity discourse exhausts political discourse, and have shockingly 
little to say about such perennial questions as class, war, the economy and the 
common good. . . .  We need a post­identity liberalism, and it should draw from 
the past successes of pre­identity liberalism. Such a liberalism would 
concentrate on . . . the issues that affect a vast majority of them.308 
While at first reading, this critique might sound similar to the argument 
laid out in this Article, it is distinct and even opposed to it. First and foremost, 
nowhere does this Article present an argument against identity politics as a 
whole.  In contrast, I assume that racial justice requires a richer paradigm 
that includes both cultural recognition and material redistribution, rather 
than trading one for the other.  I recognize that the focus only on one type 
of demand might weaken the likelihood of attaining the other.309  Second, 
unlike Lilla, I do not prioritize issues of class and war over race because I 
recognize, again unlike Lilla, that the recent activism is working against deep 
and systemic racial inequality.  Instead, my concern is about the students’ 
choice to present limited demands—in nature and in scope. Furthermore, in 
contrast to Lilla, who echoes Walter Benn Michaels310 and argues that race 
problems serve as a distraction from the real problem of class inequality, this 
	
 308 Mark Lilla, The End of Identity Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html. 
 309 See Fraser, supra note 305, at 74 (“People who are subject to both cultural injustice and economic 
injustice need both recognition and redistribution.”); see also Fraser, supra note 19, at 4 (“[I]nstead 
of arriving at a broader, richer paradigm that could encompass both redistribution and recognition, 
second-wave feminists effectively traded one truncated paradigm for another.”).  For a fierce 
critique on Lilla’s op-ed, see Katherine Franke, Making White Supremacy Respectable. Again., BLARB 
(Nov. 21, 2016), http://blog.lareviewofbooks.org/essays/making-white-supremacy-respectable/ 
(arguing that Lilla’s position “is a liberalism of white supremacy” and addressing in turn several 
facets of Lilla’s argument). 
 310 See BENN MICHAELS, supra note 264, at 19–20. 
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Article points to the ways in which the two problems are still entangled today.  
Lastly, I do not believe that the solution is to “concentrate on the issues that 
affect a vast majority.” Mainly because fighting racial inequality might never 
be a top priority for the majority.  If anything, the history of diversity’s 
transformation teaches that we should focus more on race, not only as an 
element of identity, but also as a category of power. 
Universities, student movements, and others who are committed to racial 
justice are facing a real dilemma: how to get the majority and courts to adopt 
measures to fight inequality without compromising the struggle itself.  This 
Article is meant to shed light on the dominant way of doing so today—
through diversity claims.  I described a rather worrisome development, by 
which the current understanding of diversity as a utilitarian value might 
endanger the struggle for racial justice more than it promotes it.  There is 
nothing wrong with expressing the utilitarian benefits of diversity, which are 
both real and persuasive, yet it is when this indirect approach dominates the 
conversation about race that our institutions risk losing sight of long-term 
racial progress, as well as the ability to honestly talk and act against the status 
quo of racial hierarchies.  I have also showed that in the past, diversity played 
a more robust role in unsettling racial hierarchies, but can it do so in the future? 
VII.  CONCLUSION: DIVERSITY’S FUTURE 
Diversity discourse is fundamentally and historically ambiguous and can 
accommodate conservative as well as progressive ideals about race and 
inequality.  It does not necessarily embody egalitarian commitments, but 
rather represents an ongoing struggle that can tilt either toward egalitarian 
or utilitarian values.  In the past decade the market-driven approach to 
diversity has become so dominant that it risks undermining the long-term 
struggle for racial equality.  It is now the time, I suggest, to tilt diversity back 
and reinfuse it with egalitarian ideals. 
How?  Past critiques of diversity urged advocates and the Court to 
overthrow the diversity framework as a whole and return to the pre-Bakke 
reality of remedial ideals.311  This Article, in contrast, is more realistic and 
somewhat more optimistic.  Instead of dismissing this entire successful body 
of law, it suggests that much can be done under existing equal protection law 
and within the diversity framework.  More concretely, when making diversity 
claims on campus and in court, universities and other advocates of 
affirmative action should not automatically embrace a purely utilitarian and 
market-driven approach to diversity.  Rather, they should attempt to strike a 
balance between acknowledging the utilitarian benefits of diversity that make 
it popular and easy to live with even for conservatives and the egalitarian 
	
 311 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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perspective that is at the core of racial justice.  One way of doing that is to 
return to the Michigan briefs and to Justice O’Connor’s interpretation of 
diversity in Grutter, which embraced both utilitarian and democratic values 
of equal citizenship, and insisted that diversity also embodies an interest in 
ensuring that no group is excluded from participating in public life. 
This is a time of great uncertainty in America, and no one knows what 
the composition of the Court will be under President Trump, but it seems 
safe to assume that it will not become more progressive in the foreseeable 
future.  What we do have is the most recent decision in Fisher II, in which 
Justice Kennedy—who was and is once again the swing Justice on equal 
protection cases—affirmed the diversity framework.  Adopting the diversity 
framework, the Fisher II majority did not further constrain its meaning, but 
instead it held that in defining student-body diversity, “[c]onsiderable 
deference is owed to a university in defining those intangible characteristics, 
like student body diversity, that are central to its identity and educational 
mission.”312   This deference should be understood as an opportunity to 
reshape the meaning of diversity and infuse it with new-old meanings.  While 
remedial interpretations of diversity might strike outside what is central to 
the identity of a university and be too far reaching for Justice Kennedy, 
Grutter’s forward-looking commitment to equal citizenship as a democratic 
ideal can be considered part of an “educational mission” and enjoy the 
deference of the court.  With more challenges to affirmative action in the 
pipeline,313 universities must embrace the diversity framework, and with it 
this timely opportunity to reinfuse it with egalitarian meanings that could 
change the conversation about race in courts and on campuses. 
 
	
 312  Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016). 
 313 See e.g., Students for Fair Admissions v. President & Fellows of Harv. Coll., 308 F.R.D. 39 (D. Mass. 
2015); Students for Fair Admissions v. Univ. of N.C., 319 F.R.D. 490 (M.D.N.C. 2017).   
